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Market integration in the European Union (EU) is not a straightforward 
process. This process is influenced by complex external and internal 
developments and is usually characterised by accelerations and 
backwashes. There moreover exist huge differences between economic 
sectors. Gambling markets, including lotteries, betting, casinos, gaming 
machines and bingo, are particularly controversial and have recently 
become a hot topic of debate regarding European integration. In February 
2006 gambling markets have been excluded from the so-called ‘service 
directive’ but continue to be under influence of processes of globalisation, 
juridical consideration, market liberalisation and technological innovation. 
As this publication demonstrates, various gambling organisations across 
the EU respond in quite different ways to European developments.  
Debates on lotteries and other gambling organisations usually carry 
strong emotional overtones. This is because of the moral controversies 
over gambling and the strong political and economic interests associated 
with the gambling industry. The authors therefore believe that sound 
scientific research should guide the debate. However, international 
comparative research in the field of gambling is rather limited. Regarding 
the EU this report only serves as a pilot study. Empirically the research 
was restricted to the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden, 
Hungary and Italy. The research is part of ongoing scientific research in 
the field of gambling studies at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.  
This particular pilot study has been sponsored – but was not 
commissioned – by the Dutch Good Causes Lotteries (NGCL), who have an 
interest in this research not only because it addresses lottery markets but 
also because it takes in explicit consideration the distribution of the 
revenues, including the benefits of lotteries for civil society organisations. 
The authors wish to thank the NGCL for their support but also wish to 
stress that the NGCL did not interfere in the research design, the 
information gathering and the interpretation of the findings. The authors 
would furthermore like to thank all of the officials, operators and other 
informants who have been helpful in the research. Special thanks to the 
reviewers who were willing to comment upon (parts) of the draft, in 
particular Per Binde from Göteborg University.  
We hope that this publication is in one way or another of use to 
those interested in the debate on gambling in the EU and that our analysis 
furthers international comparative research on the regulation of gambling 
organisations. 
 
Dr. Sytze F. Kingma and drs. Tatiana van Lier 
 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, April 2006 






The objective of this research is to explore the development of gambling 
markets, in particular lottery organisations, across the European Union in 
relation to the civil society and developments on the level of the EU.  
The pilot study includes a selected number of contrasting member states: 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary and Italy.  
The report also addresses major analytical and methodical challenges 
regarding lottery research in the context of the EU and provides guidelines 
for further research. 
 
Research questions 
The major research questions in the study are: 1) What are the 
differences in the development of gambling markets and policies in the 
member states of the EU, from the 1990s onwards, in particular regarding 
market liberalisations? 2) How do lottery organisations in the member 
states of the EU relate to the wider society; in particular regarding the 
role of the state, the market and the civil society? 3) Which international 
processes influence the development of lotteries in the member states of 




The pilot study has substantiated the initial impressions that gambling 
markets and policies have been liberalised in the recent past. 
Furthermore, the social and economic significance of gambling, and the 
benefits of lotteries for the state and the civil society in particular, have 
increased tremendously. Finally, the European Union emerges as a new 
level of regulation in the field of gambling.   
There is a common trajectory of liberalisation in the selected 
member states. However, the nature and extent of the liberalisations and 
the liberalisation processes are not equal in the contrasting countries. 
There are processes of convergence and divergence between the gambling 
regimes.  
 
Market segments and products 
In the overall range of market segments and products there is a clear 




in the relative size of the various market segments. For instance, in 
Sweden and Britain, betting is far more popular than in the Netherlands, 
while the last one stands out in the popularity of lotteries, in particular 
good causes lotteries. In Italy and Hungary, lotteries also cover more than 
half of the market. A general market trend, which applies to all of the 
sample countries and which can be expected to continue, is the increasing 
market differentiation and product variation. 
 
Remote gambling 
Remote gambling is a market in which divergence rather than 
convergence seems to emerge (in the short term). Sweden and the UK for 
instance readily adopted Internet and mobile phone gaming, while the 
Netherlands, Italy and Hungary seem reluctant or lagging behind in this 
new market segment. 
 
Gambling regulation 
Divergence also emerges in the area of gambling regulation, in particular 
the controlling power of the state: the benchmark case, the Netherlands, 
is in this respect better compared to Britain and Sweden than to Italy and 
Hungary. In the Netherlands, Britain and Sweden we find rather complex 
or multi-dimensional regulatory models.  This situation is characterised by 
a separation between gambling legislation and gambling control, and also 
by differentiations in the modes of operation, like private, state or civil 
society organisations acting as operator. In Italy and Hungary we find 
rather one-dimensional models in which the operation of gambling 
markets is concentrated by the state, which may decide to contract out 
the operation to private or other parties. A general trend in regulation, 
which can be expected to continue, is the increasing complexity of 
gambling regulation regimes.   
 
Position of lotteries 
The position of lotteries is largely defined by the overall gambling regimes. 
Relevant for lottery markets is the distinction between high-risk and low-
risk forms of gambling. This distinction refers to the risk of gambling 
addiction, which in the case of lotteries is considered comparatively low. 
The distinction between high-risk and low-risk gambling is typical for 




gambling policies in the Netherlands, Britain and Sweden, but to a far 
lesser extent in Italy and Hungary.   
 
Civil society involvement 
In the contrasting countries, there a large differences in the economic 
size, structure, and significance of the civil society. The Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK all have a rather large, and well-organised civil 
society. Civil society in Italy and Hungary are relatively small, and 
characterised by a low level of sector integration.  
Regarding the shares of the civil society in gambling markets 
divergence rather than convergence seems to emerge in our sample 
countries. In the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain, civil society 
organisations benefit to a large extent directly from gambling, while 
organisations in Italy and Hungary primarily benefit indirectly through 
redistribution mechanisms of the state. The private sector involvement in 
these countries is much bigger than in the Netherlands and Sweden. The 
study suggests that an adaptation of the approach of gambling markets 
(even without adapting the regulatory model), would enable the state to 
include civil society organisations to a larger extent in both its outsourcing 
as its redistribution policies.  
 
Reactions on European and technological developments 
Regarding European and technological developments, we focus on the 
regulatory level, on the national level and on the organisational level. The 
issues involved are both political and legal. In the context of the 
completion of the internal market and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), national gambling policies and organisations both 
influence the European Union, and manage the consequences of European 
Union policies.  
The Gambelli case (2003) has become a central point of reference. 
In this case, the ECJ applied the principle of proportionality to gambling 
markets, meaning that national restrictions on the exploitation of 
gambling are only allowed if the restrictive policies are convincingly 
applied. This has changed European discussion on gambling from a 
discussion on subsidiarity to a discussion on proportionality.  
Our hypothesis is that current interest in gambling organisations 
can reinforce restrictive policies, as happened in the Netherlands, because 




international competition. However, these restrictive policies on the 
national level are at the same time undermined by market liberalisations.  
Also relevant for the analysis is the organisational level. 
International networks between operators, regulators and researchers are 
developing. Our hypothesis is that these international networks itself will 
contribute to harmonisation of gambling markets because of the 









The objective of this report is to assess recent developments on European 
gambling markets in view of the future options for lottery organisations 
and their beneficiaries. Since this is a complex topic with a broad scope, 
and the research in this field is barely emerging, a pilot study has been 
conducted aimed at an exploration of the major developments in gambling 
markets and policies within the EU, in relation to the wider society and 
interactions with developments on the level of the EU. A pilot study means 
that the research is not so much directed at finding clear and complete 
answers to the research questions, it rather means that this report 
explores the range of possible answers and hypotheses. The report also 
addresses major analytical and methodical challenges regarding lottery 




1.2 Lottery organisations and the European Union 
During the 1990s gambling markets, including slot machines, lotteries and 
casinos, in many countries have been liberalised and expanded 
significantly. This expansion wave is a virtually global phenomenon 
(McMillen 1996; Eadington 1997; Kingma 2002; Collins 2003; Miers 
2004). There are clear market pressures on national governments to treat 
lotteries as a free market in the entertainment economy. These pressures 
and developments, however, are in sharp contrast with and contradict 
traditional policies. The organisation and regulation of gambling is 
traditionally characterised by strong national interests and (legal) 
frameworks, in which gambling markets are tightly regulated by the state. 
In many cases gambling markets are even organised by state monopolies. 
Direct market competition was discouraged because of the moral 
controversies over gambling and the association of gambling with risks 
concerning addiction and crime. This also means that national gambling 
organisations were, and in most cases still are, protected from 
competition from abroad and are usually not allowed to expand their 






The EU relates in roughly two ways to the contradictions between 
on the one hand the national regulation and protection of gambling 
markets and on the other hand processes of liberalisation, 
internationalisation and globalisation. First, most member states are 
confronted with and have to deal with similar market pressures towards 
liberalisation. This may in time possibly lead to a convergence (or 
divergence) of national gambling policies and gambling cultures. Second, 
the EU arises as a relatively new level of governance in the field of 
gambling, with which national governments and gambling organisations 
increasingly have to reckon with. National gambling policies have to be 
positioned and legitimised in one way or another vis-à-vis the newly 
emerging regulatory force of the EU. Gambling markets are confronted, 
for instance by cases brought to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), with 
the strive towards a ‘Single European market’, in particular with the EU 
freedoms of establishment, goods and services.  In 1992 it was decided, 
in reference to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, that gambling regulation was 
best served at the national level, but the European Commission (EC) re-
evaluated this position in view of market liberalisations and Internet 
gambling. A complicating circumstance is that the EU is not a constant but 
a changing factor, in particular because of the enlargement of the EU. A 
significant point of interest for lotteries is the way gambling organisations 
are related to the wider society, through the distribution of revenues and 
the close connections with the civil society. Changes in regulations and 
international market developments may affect the participation of civil 
society organisations on the lottery market and the opportunities and 
constraints of beneficiaries. 
On the topic of gambling in the EU, a huge knowledge gap exists 
regarding the differences and similarities in national gambling markets 
and policies. On this subject there simply is no systematic and 
scientifically valid knowledge available. International comparative research 
in the field of gambling is remarkably scarce (Thompson 1998; Garret 
2001). To the extent that comparative research is available, the analyses 
are usually superficial and fragmentary. For example the recent study 
Gambling on Culture (Bodo 2004) (p.139), explicitly concludes that there 
definitely are huge differences in the organisation of lotteries and the 
distribution of revenues, but that our understanding of the nature of, and 
the reasons for, these differences is rather limited. In order to improve 
our understanding it is in our view necessary to focus the analyses on the 






wider society (Kingma 2004). The liberalisation and expansion of gambling 
organisations within the various member states of the EU does not take 
place at the same moment or at the same time, and also differs 
considerably with respect to the various types of gambling, for instance 
casinos versus lotteries. The complexity of the matter can further be 
related to differences in the relationships between gambling organisations 
on the one hand and the state, the market and the civil society on the 
other. Also highly relevant in this respect are developments related to 
international policies as well as commercial and organisational 
developments on the international level. 
 
 
1.3 Research questions 
Against this background the major research questions of this pilot study 
are as follows: 
 
1. What are the differences and similarities in the development of 
gambling markets and policies in the member states of the EU, 
from the 1990s onwards, in particular regarding market 
liberalisations? 
2. How do lottery organisations in the member states of the EU relate 
to the wider society, in particular regarding the role of the state and 
the civil society? 
3. Which international processes influence the development of lotteries 
in the member states of the EU, in particular regarding 
technological developments and international organisations? 
    
Ad 1. Politically, economically and culturally, gambling refers to a highly 
peculiar and controversial category of play because of the dependency on 
chance and the transformation of the meaning of money (Reith 2002). 
Therefore, commercial gambling organisations have in many cases been 
controversial and are regulated by specific gambling policies. The 
legalisation and liberalisation of gambling implies major transformations in 
gambling policies, including a shift in the cultural meaning and 
legitimisation of gambling (Cosgrave 2001). This also involves a crucial 
shift in the meanings attributed to gambling, a shift from gambling as a 
morally disputed vice towards gambling as a normalised entertainment 
product (Abt 1984; Rosecrance 1988). Regarding the process of 






nowadays regarded and treated as mainstream economic enterprises 
offering ‘normal’ services and products. For lotteries it is of particular 
importance how and to which extent they are demarcated from other 
categories of gambling, for instance because of the comparative low risk 
of problem gambling (Griffiths 1999). To which extent do gambling 
policies distinguish between high-risk and low-risk games (Kingma 
2004)?1 We also like to know in which respects (for instance licensing, 
gambling products, supervision, competition, advertising, accessibility) the 
various regulation policies have been liberalised during the 1990s. And 
how have these changes been motivated and legitimated? Ultimately, we 
would like to know whether European integration furthers market 
liberalisations or rather provokes protective responses?  
 
Ad 2. The organisation of gambling is traditionally characterised by a 
strong involvement of the state, not only as regulator but also as operator 
and beneficiary. Equally characteristic for the organisation of gambling is 
the involvement of the ‘civil society’ (Salamon 1999), i.e. the good 
causes, charities and other public benefits associated with gambling (both 
as initiator and beneficiary). To which extent do the state, the operators 
and the beneficiaries have similar or conflicting interests in the 
liberalisation of gambling? And are there shared values and organisational 
principles in the making regarding gambling? We would like to know how 
processes of liberalisation and European integration affect the relative 
positions between the state, the market and the civil society in the field of 
gambling. To which extent, for instance, serve gambling revenues as 
substitutes for taxes in the context of a retreat of the welfare state (Bodo 
2004)? And to which extent does liberalisation imply new opportunities for 
civil society organisations to promote and profit from gambling? Does 
European integration simply favour the commercial interests of operators, 
or does it rather strengthen the wider societal interests associated with 
gambling like taxes and good causes? 
                                                 
1 In gambling policies the distinction between high-risk and low-risk games (the 
chance of addiction) is also referred to as long odds versus short odds (the 
difference between stake and profit), ‘slow’ versus ‘fast’ profit games (the time 
between distribution of profit and next stake) or ‘non-continuous’ versus 
‘continuous’ gambling (the speed of the wager–play–outcome sequence). It 
should be noted that besides product characteristics also social (like the target 
groups) and contextual (like accessibility) circumstances influence the risk profiles 








Ad 3. The organisation of gambling is traditionally confined to the context 
of the nation state. Of increasing importance, however, are the 
interdependencies of European gambling markets, related to cross-border 
gambling and gambling via the Internet. Highly relevant is the evolving 
jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and decisions made 
by the European Commission regarding market classifications, notably the 
‘service directive.’ Regarding the enlargement of scale we want to know 
how domestic and local gambling organisations respond to and contribute 
to international and trans-national activities. Does this field for instance 
contain a risk of ‘regulatory competition,’ in which member states seek to 
adapt their gambling policies to the member states with the most lenient 
prescriptions? And will the EC perhaps distance itself from the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ because of the tendencies towards liberalisation? A relevant 
case is the recent Gambelli case in which the ECJ decided that national 
governments are allowed to ban foreign gambling enterprises on their 
territory, provided that they deploy convincing gambling policies in line 
with this ban (Verbiest 2004). Also significant are initiatives taken by 
gambling organisations regarding international competition and 
cooperation. What are for instance the interests and activities of European 
associations of gambling organisations like GREF (Gambling Regulators 
European Forum) or European Lotteries (an association of state lotteries 
and toto’s)?  
 
 
1.4 Research strategy 
In this pilot study we want to explore the development of gambling 
markets, in particular lottery organisations, across the EU in relation to 
the wider society and developments on the level of the EU. The question is 
how the European context intervenes in, and facilitates or discourages, 
certain trajectories of development for domestic gambling markets. Since 
objective criteria are hard to define, the Netherlands will serve as a 
benchmark for comparison. In particular the extent of liberalisation will be 
defined with reference to the Dutch situation. Furthermore, because we 
focus upon dynamic processes, from 1990 onwards, and the interests, 
strategies and opinions of various organisations, an exploration of the 
range of possible differences in the field of gambling across the entire EU 
is, for a pilot study, considered impossible and undesirable. The research 






Netherlands, four contrasting cases are selected for the comparison and 
the collection of information. These cases include the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Hungary and Italy.   
 This selection of cases is based upon the general idea of exploring 
maximal differences within the EU against minimal costs, respectively a 
minimum of case studies (Pennings 1999). The selection of countries is 
primarily based upon differences in state structures, socio-economic 
circumstances and national cultures. The sample also represents countries 
with quite different histories and attitudes in relation to the EU. The UK 
represents a relatively libertarian Anglo-Saxon State with a strong 
orientation on monetary policies and a wide range of class cultural 
differences. The UK is known for its standoffish attitude regarding the EU. 
Sweden represents a Nordic State with well-developed welfare policies 
and a relatively egalitarian indigenous culture. Sweden can be 
characterised as a critical ‘follower’ in processes of European integration. 
Hungary represents one of the new Central European members of the EU 
(Schimmelfennig 2005). For this case we consider relevant the communist 
past, the relatively strong bureaucratic state structures and the 
comparatively low living standards. Finally, Italy has been selected as a 
Mediterranean state, with relatively centralistic and bureaucratic 
structures and hierarchical cultural features. Italy is also one of the large 
leading countries of the EU. These stereotypical and perhaps partial 
characteristics only serve to justify the selection of countries and do not 
suggest specific hypotheses about gambling policies. How structural 
differences between states translate in the field of gambling is in this pilot 
study considered to be a matter of empirical research. 
The analyses are generally based upon secondary sources, like 
scientific publications, policy reports and company data. Because not al 
the necessary information was readily available, or differed in focus and 
profundity (and language), for each country informants were contacted 
from organisations central to the field of gambling. The sample included 
regulatory organisations, lottery operators and civil society organisations. 
A list of participants has been included as a supplement to this report 
(Supplement IV).  
One of the major problems for comparative research is that 
secondary facts and figures for each country have been collected at 
different moments and in different ways, and often also represent 
different situations. A state lottery, for instance, is not operated in the 






similar products. Gambling markets, products and regulations are usually 
not defined in (exactly) the same way in each country. A gambling board, 
for instance, does not have the same composition and does not hold the 
same power or perform the same tasks in each country. Problems of 
comparison also arise with respect to market classifications and figures on 
returns, profits and taxes. We will consider all markets on which products 
are offered were money is staked in return for a chance on prizes as 
gambling markets. We distinguish the following broad categories of 
gambling markets: lotteries and lotto’s, (sports) betting, casinos, gaming 
machines, bingo, and remote gambling (like Internet gambling and SMS 
games). Of course, these markets are to a certain extent overlapping. 
Regarding the market returns, prizes, profits and taxes we have tried to 
maintain a uniform logic of definitions and calculations in the report. 
Returns across markets will for instance be compared on the basis of net 
returns (gross returns minus prizes). This means that in some cases 
figures are presented somewhat differently from specific market 
standards. Figures will be presented in Euros (with the amounts in 
national currencies between brackets). We will discuss the relevant 
differences throughout the report, but have nevertheless tried, for reasons 
of comparison, to provide a generalised overview of differences between 
the five countries regarding regulations (Supplement II) and markets 
(Supplement I and III).   
 
 
1.5 Outline of the report  
The report is designed around the three major research questions. After 
this introductory chapter, which provides the background to the pilot 
study, the research questions and our approach, we will start in chapter 2 
with an analysis of the similarities and differences regarding the gambling 
markets and policies in the five countries. In chapter 3 we will analyse the 
relations between lottery organisations and the civil society in these 
countries, including the distribution of lottery revenues. Chapter 4 focuses 
on the European developments regarding cross-border gambling, the 
policy of the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and 
international organisations in the field of gambling. In the concluding 
chapter 5 we will discuss, based on the previous chapters, the major 
findings, the challenges for the study of European lottery markets and 
hypotheses regarding the future development of lotteries in the EU. 
 










This chapter deals with the first research question. We will discuss the 
differences and similarities in the development of gambling markets and 
policies, from the 1990s onwards, in the five selected member states of 
the EU. We focus in particular on market liberalisations, which to a greater 
or lesser extent occurred in each of the selected countries. We will start 
with the Netherlands, which serve as a benchmark in our comparison 
between Sweden, the UK, Italy and Hungary. In our analysis we 
distinguish between regulation and market developments. Regulation 
includes legal frameworks, supervision and gambling policies.  Market 
developments include the operators, market growth, market 
differentiations, product innovations and marketing. In our discussion on 
regulations and market development we will also discuss (changes in) the 
legitimation of gambling. To which extent is gambling in the various 
countries for instance considered morally controversial? Is it simply seen 
as a mechanism to generate (state) revenues? Or is it rather seen as pure 
entertainment, i.e. a normalised economic activity? To which extent is 
gambling associated with addiction and crime? And are there economic 
benefits, good causes or charities associated with gambling? 
 Although we have a special interest in lotteries, it is important to 
relate lotteries to the general market and policy developments in the field 
of gambling. This is because lotteries are generally discussed and 
regulated in the same legal framework. The development of lotteries can, 
in part, be understood and explained in reference to the national regimes 
of regulation for gambling. In this respect we specifically analyse for each 
of the five countries, in which respects and to which extent lottery 
markets are distinguished, and regulated and operated differently, from 
other categories of gambling games. 
 
 
2.2 The Netherlands  
The Dutch gambling regime has experienced several liberalisations during 
the 1990s, both regarding regulations and market developments. The 
logic and dynamics in the development of Dutch gambling organisations 
are comparable to the four selected countries, although there are at the 




same time considerable differences. In this paragraph we will briefly 
illustrate what gambling in the Netherlands looks like.  
 The Dutch Gambling Act prohibits the operation of any form of 
public gambling without a license issued by the state. The Dutch law on 
gambling explicitly allows for lotteries and lotto, betting on horse races, 
casinos, charity bingo and small prize contests, and gaming machines in 
arcades and restaurants and pubs. Today’s legal framework for games of 
chance dates from 1964 but has been seriously extended and modified, in 
particular in 1974 (extension with casinos, lotto and bingo), 1986 
(extension with gaming machines) and 1992 (extension with the instant 
lottery). The gambling act is currently under revision and this revision 
primarily aims at a harmonisation of the various gambling regulations. 
Licenses are issued by the Ministry of Justice or, for small-scale 
operations, at the local level, for instance regarding small-scale lotteries 
(maximum of total prizes of €4.500) and charity bingo (maximum of total 
prizes  € 1.400). In the Netherlands the commercial operation of bingo is 
not allowed. 
In this study we focus on nation wide and commercially operated 
types of gambling. There are four types of lottery organisations: a) the 
Dutch State Lottery (SENS); b) the Lotto and Sports Toto organisation, 
which also exploits the instant lottery (SNS); c) the National Good Causes 
Lotteries (National Postcode Lottery, the Sponsor Lottery and the Bank 
Lottery); d) The Grote Club Actie, a yearly national lottery organised by 
many small scale clubs and associations; these clubs and societies are 
responsible for the selling of the lottery tickets and their individual share 
depends on these sales. These four national lottery organisations have 
quite different histories and socio-economic backgrounds, they exploit 
different types of games and they operate under different legal provisions.  
The lotteries are differently regulated from other types of 
commercial gambling that are allowed under Dutch law: casinos, gaming 
machines and betting on horse races. There are currently thirteen casinos 
operated by the state monopoly of Holland Casino. The only form of 
private operation on the Dutch gambling market is the gaming-machines 
business. In the Netherlands casinos and gaming machines are both 
popular and extremely profitable gambling markets. Although betting on 
horse races is also allowed, and exploited by Hippo Toto (currently by 
Scientific Games) on course (since 1948) and off course (since 1989), this 
has never been a very successful branch of the Dutch gambling market. 




The Dutch Gambling Act explicitly prohibits sweepstakes and 
pyramid games. Until the early 1990s there were considerable problems 
with illegal gambling and crime, notably regarding casinos, gaming 
machines and also number games. However, these problems have largely 
been overcome, in part because of the expansion of legal gambling 
opportunities. Instead, the dominant problematic and regulatory concern 
on the gambling market became the issue of gambling addiction or 
problem gambling. The prevalence of problem gambling has been 
seriously surveyed in the Netherlands (nation wide in 1993, 1996 and 
recently in 2005). In 1996 it was estimated that approximately 70.000 
Dutch adults could be problem gamblers, which is approximately 0,6% of 
the population aged 12-75 (Koeter 1996). The most recent research 
(2005) gives an indication of approximately 40.000 problem gamblers 
(0,4% of the population). In these surveys, problem gambling is primarily 
associated with high-risk games like casinos and gaming machines. On 
the lottery market only scratch cards have been explicitly associated with 
problem gambling. 
 
2.2.1 Regulatory developments 
In the early 1990s regulatory liberalisations involved the licensing of the 
Sponsor Lottery and to the National Postcode Lottery, both lotteries 
raising money for good causes. In 1992, the Dutch State lottery was 
denationalised (SENS). A year later the SNS, the operator of lotto and the 
sports toto, got permission to operate an instant lottery; for this purpose 
the Dutch Instant Lottery (Nederlandse Instant Loterij, NIL) was 
established. At the end of 2000, the formal separation between SNS and 
NIL was lifted and the Lotto, Toto, Lucky Day and the Dutch Instant 
Lottery continued under SNS, the statutory name of De Lotto.  In 2000 
the government amended the Gambling Act again regarding gaming 
machines: linked jackpots and multiplayer machines were introduced in 
arcades. 
In 2003 most tasks in the regulation of gambling were concentrated 
at the Ministry of Justice, were a special department was established to 
coordinate gambling policy. Before that time several ministries were 
involved in the management and supervision of the concessionaries: the 
Ministry of Finance was responsible for the state lottery, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs was responsible for Holland Casino and the policies 
regarding gaming machines; the Ministry of Justice was responsible for 
licensing of Good Causes Lotteries; the Ministry of Public Health, Welfare 




and Sports was responsible for sports betting; and the Ministry of 
Agriculture was responsible for horse betting. The involvement of these 
different ministries led to mixed interests and fragmented gambling 
policies.  
In 1996 a specialised Gambling Board (College van Toezicht; CvT) 
was established, which was in fact an extension of the previous Casinos 
Council. The main task of this independent body is the supervision of the 
national gambling organisations. However, contrary to many other 
European Gambling Boards, the Dutch Gambling Board doesn't have any 
policy formation, licensing or surveillance powers. This board only has an 
advisory task on the ‘social significance’ of gambling. In practice the Dutch 
Gambling Board also adopted a task for the gathering of information and 
the monitoring of gambling markets.  
The liberalisation and expansion of the gambling market led in 
1995, in combination with serious concerns and public debate about 
gambling addiction regarding gaming machines, to a consolidation policy 
(Ministerie van Justitie 1995). The government seriously reduced the 
number of gaming machines outside of the amusement arcades and also 
decided not to issue any more licenses for national lotteries (lotteries with 
prizes exceeding €4500). However, a few years later, a government 
commission published the so-called MDW-report (2000), which promoted 
a far-reaching liberalisation of gambling markets in the Netherlands. This 
report was part of a larger government operation to examine the options 
of deregulation and liberalisation on various markets, as for instance the 
postal service, the media and public transport. In the MDW report 
gambling was completely considered to be a regular economic activity.  
In 2002, however, the proposals in the MDW report were 
predominantly left aside and a far more restrictive policy was started. For 
example decisions on Internet gambling and the expansion of the number 
of casinos were postponed. In 2003, parliament decided to reform the 
Gambling Act, in order to harmonise gambling markets and to make it 
compatible with technological developments such as Internet gambling. 
The new legislation is not expected before the end of 2006. Regarding 
lotteries, the harmonisation of the legal provisions is high on the political 
agenda. However, the government decided that differences should be 
maintained to a certain extent. This means that the State Lottery (SENS) 
and Lotto (SNS) keep their position as lotteries with high prize payout, 
while the so-called “Good Causes Lotteries” of the NGDL keep their 
position as lotteries with high contribution to good causes. The issue of 




harmonisation of lotteries and the distribution of revenues was further 
discussed in a special government commission (Schuyt 2004).  
 
2.2.2 Market developments  
Since 1990 the Dutch gambling market has grown significantly: total 
gross returns (before deduction of the prizes) of the lotteries went from 
€792 million in 1996 to €1.5 billion in 2004, a rise of more than 90%. In 
addition the growth of Holland Casino was also enormous. More recently 
however, after 2000, the spectacular market growth on Dutch gambling 
markets stagnated (College van Toezicht op de Kansspelen 2005). 
Market differentiation and an increase in the variation of gambling 
games also characterises the development. The State Lottery, for 
instance, introduced a number of new games: a special New Years Eve 
game in 1993, the Jackpot, and a weekly lottery called Dayzers. In 1993 
The Lotto (SNS) introduced the instant lottery. In 1989 the National 
Postcode Lottery  (NPL) introduced a completely new lottery format. The 
new approach involved a new format of the lottery game, with a 
combination of individual and street or neighbourhood participation. The 
new format also combined the good causes and charity organisations that 
founded the lottery with modern mass media, including television shows. 
This all contributed to the success of the National Postcode Lottery. Gross 
returns of the NPL grew from €6,8 million (fl 15 million) in 1990 to €145 
million (fl 320 million) in 1994 (Veer van 't 1998). The NPL was soon able 
to expand the number of key beneficiaries from three to seven.2  
Increased marketing activities like advertising and the use of 
television shows were not unique to the Postcode Lottery, but 
characterised the entire gambling market, including the State Lottery, The 
Lotto and Holland Casino. Since the early nineties there has been a 
significant increase in the competition between lottery operators and the 
amount of advertising of gambling products in the Netherlands. Recently 
the Dutch lottery organisations together developed a code for advertising 
in order to (self)-regulate the advertising. 
Besides product innovation and new marketing tools, at two points 
lottery operators tried to merger: In 1999, the Dutch Competition Board 
(NMA) vetoed a planned merger between the Dutch State Lottery (SENS), 
the Lotto (SNS) and the Bank Lottery. According to the NMA, this would 
                                                 
2 In 1992, the World Wide Fund (WWF), Médicins sans Frontières (MSF), UNICEF 
and the DOEN Foundation became new beneficiaries of the NPL. See also 
paragraph 3.2.2 




significantly obstruct economic competition on the lottery market. In 2004 
the NMA did approve a merger between the National Postcode 
Lottery/Sponsor Lottery and the Bank Lottery. The boards of the three 
lotteries were fused into the Holding “National Good Causes Lotteries NV”, 
although the lotteries remained separate brands and lottery products, and 
they kept their own beneficiaries. In the field of casinos and gaming 
machines market developments were on the one hand characterised by 
product innovations and on the other hand by a concern for consumer 
protection and problem gambling. During the 1990s Holland Casino 
expanded from three to twelve casinos. These were all high-class urban 
casinos embedded in local environments with consumption and 
entertainment facilities. Within Holland Casinos the exploitation of 
gambling products was rationalised and the range of gambling products 
was diversified, notably the gaming machine division was expanded and 
nowadays accounts for over 60% of the casino returns. The Dutch casinos 
also developed anti-addiction policies in which casino personnel spots and 
confronts problem gamblers. In the Netherlands the number of local 
amusement arcades slightly decreased (to 255 in 2003) (KEMA 2003). 
Similar to the casinos, many arcades were seriously upgraded. However, 
in the early 1990s most local municipalities seriously diminished the 
exploitation of gaming machines outside of the arcades (in pubs and 




In the Netherlands, the benchmark case of this study, in the 1990s the 
gambling markets were clearly liberalised, in the sense that market 
opportunities were expanded. This liberalisation included the extension of 
the Gambling Act, enabling more gambling products to be exploited. The 
liberalisation also included spectacular market growth, increasing 
competition, market differentiation and marketing expenditures. Around 
2000 there even was a serious debate in the Netherlands about a 
complete liberalisation and privatisation of gambling organisations. 
However, there also were serious backwashes on the gambling markets. 
These backwashes were caused by concerns over problem gambling in the 
market for gaming machines and casinos and concerns over increasing 
competition in the lottery market. After 2002 the spectacular market 
growth came to an end and many liberalisation initiatives were dropped or 
postponed. A remarkable aspect of the Dutch lottery market is the 









Sweden can be characterised as a typical welfare state with strict 
gambling regulations. In the previous paragraphs we have seen that the 
Dutch gambling sector has experienced significant liberalisations. Similar 
developments took place on the Swedish gambling market, although we 
will also come across some remarkable differences. We will start with a 
short illustration of the Swedish gambling situation. Subsequently we will 
discuss developments in regulation and market developments.  
Sweden is in many aspects quite similar to the Netherlands. The 
gambling market is tightly regulated and private profits are not allowed, 
except for some low stake forms of gambling in so-called restaurant 
casinos. All gambling revenues are destined for public benefit only. The 
regulations placed onto the Swedish gambling and lottery market stem 
from the idea that lotteries represent a fraud or usury sensitive category 
of products and services (Lotteriinspektionen 2004). The Swedish 
legislation uses a rather broad definition of lotteries: horse racing, and 
other kinds of betting, and gaming machines are all addressed as ‘lottery’. 
The legal framework for gambling in Sweden is determined by the 
Lottery Act (1994) and the Casino Act (1999). The Lottery Act regulates 
all drawing games, guessing, betting, bingo, gaming machines, roulette-, 
dice-, and card games (in restaurants and hotels). The Casino Act (1999) 
regulates the four Swedish casinos. Different from the Netherlands is that 
the state operates more gambling products.   The largest organisation on 
the Swedish market is AB Svenska Spel, a 100% state-owned company. 
In 1996 this organisation resulted from a merger between two 
government agencies: Tipstjänst (Sports betting) and Penninglotteriet 
(national lottery). Svenska Spel has a monopoly on organising the lottery- 
and  number games, sports betting, dog racing (discontinued), gaming 
machines and casinos. This company is one of the few European state-
owned operators to offer such a wide range of gambling products. 
Svenska Spel and ATG are regulated by yearly concession issued by the 
government. In issues that are not explicitly covered by the licenses, the 
Lottery Act and Casino Act apply to these companies.  
A remarkable difference with the Netherlands is the enormous 
popularity of betting on sports and horse races in Sweden, where in the 




Netherlands this is only a marginal branch of the gambling sector. The 
second largest operator on the Swedish market is AB Trav och Galopp 
(ATG), a state-controlled company founded in the 1970s and owned by 
the equestrian sports sector. ATG has the sole right to arrange betting on 
horses. Finally, public benefit organisations have, similar to the 
Netherlands, the right to organise lotteries or bingo games, as local, 
regional or national games. ‘Public benefit organisations’ is a collective 
term to address voluntary associations that carry out work for the public 
benefit.  
Swedish gambling policies explicitly recognise and address the risks 
of problem gambling. The ministry of Health and Social Affairs is therefore 
closely involved in the health aspects of gambling. One of the objectives 
of the Swedish National Institute of Public Health (Folkhälsoinstitutet, 
SNIPH), which is part of the ministry, is a reduction in the harmful effects 
of excessive gambling. This institute is also involved in the 
implementation of surveys and finances scientific research. In 1998 it was 
estimated that between 1.5% and 2.5% of the Swedish residents aged 
15-74 could be classified as problem or even pathological gamblers. In 
Sweden restaurant casino games and slot machines are most likely to 
contribute to problem gambling, while the lotteries hardly contribute to 
this problematic at all (Ronnberg 1999). Also the recent popularity of 
Internet poker is a cause for concern.  
 
 
2.3.1 Regulatory developments 
Since 1994 the Swedish Lottery Act has been amended several times. In 
1996 the Lottery Act allowed for video lottery terminals (VLTs). Ever since 
1979 the exploitation of gaming machines had been completely prohibited 
in Sweden. The VLTs, operated by Svenska Spel under the name Jack 
Vegas, are placed in restaurants with a license to sell alcohol, and in the 
bingo halls run by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In 1999, the 
Lottery Act was amended to restrict the placement of so-called 
Amusement with Prices (AWP) machines to amusement arcades. And in 
February 2002, all AWP machines and other gaming machines were 
banned. Currently the Jack Vegas are the only kind of gaming machines 
allowed in Sweden. The main reason for the prohibition of the AWP 
machines was the claim that they were used as slot machines. There are 
many slot machines in the state-owned casinos.  




Compared to the Netherlands, where casinos were already 
introduced in the 1970s, Sweden was relatively late with the introduction 
of casinos. Swedish Parliament adopted the Casino Act in 1999 and the 
first casino opened in 2000. As in the Netherlands, casino gaming is a 
state monopoly. A subsidiary of Svenska Spel is licensed to operate the 
four casinos in Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg and Sundsvall. 
In 2000, a government commission reviewed the gambling policy 
and made some proposals to amend the Lottery Act, mostly concerning 
Internet gambling. As a result, the Lottery Act was amended in 2002 in 
order to allow non-profit organisations to organise bingo, lotteries and 
Internet casinos, via SMS, and via digital television (IdTV). In 2003 
Svenska Spel and ATG were allowed the same rights. This approach is 
quite different from the Netherlands, where in 2004 the Ministry of Justice 
explicitly refused to give permission to the State Lottery for an SMS game.  
Svenska Spel is operated directly under the control of the Ministry 
of Finance. The Swedish government appoints its board and director 
general. All political parties are represented in this board. The Swedish 
Gaming Board (Lotteriinspektionen) was established in 1994 and also 
placed directly under the Ministry of Finance. It has the power to issue 
licenses for all lotteries that are arranged in more than one county 
(smaller lotteries are handled by counties or municipal authorities). 
Furthermore, the Board has the powers to impose fines to those 
organisations that act contrary to the Lottery Act. This control structure is 
quite different from the Netherlands, in terms of controlling powers and 
the direct link with the government.  
 
 
2.3.2 Market developments 
As in the Netherlands, during the 1990s the Swedish market has 
experienced an extensive growth and many product innovations. Sweden 
is one of the first EU members to introduce instant lotteries. The instant 
game TRISS was already introduced in 1986, and, like in many countries, 
immediately became a huge success. In the same year Oddset, a system 
of online sales of sports betting, was introduced. Many countries have 
imitated this type of sports betting. 
Looking at the type of games on offer and the market shares we 
can notice several differences between Sweden and the Netherlands.  
Compared to the Netherlands, betting is far more popular in Sweden: in 
2003, gross turnover of the total gambling market in Sweden was €3.9 




billion, of which €1.5 billion, or 39%, came from betting games. Sales of 
lotteries and other number games reached €1.2 billion, or 32%. However, 
this picture looks somewhat different if we look at the net returns (gross 
turnover minus prizes). Total net returns in 2004 amounted to €1.6 
billion. Lotteries contributed €682 million (42%), €517 (32%) came from 
betting games (Lotteriinspektionen 2004). Gaming machines have a 
market share of 14% (net turnover) and became increasingly popular. 
Within five years the VLTs, introduced in 1996, have become the most 
successful brand of Svenska Spel. The machines, Jack Vegas  are placed 
in restaurants and bars that had a license to sell alcohol and in bingo 
halls.  
Sweden also differs from the Netherlands with regard to Internet 
gambling. After 2002 Svenska Spel started to offer gambling products via 
the Internet. Also, several experiments have taken place regarding 
gambling via SMS. In November 2002, Svenska Spel signed a partnership 
agreement with gaming supplier Boss Media to develop digital scratch 
cards, lotteries and other instant games, primarily for the Internet. In 
2005 Internet bingo, SMS scratch cards TRISS and Tria and bingo via SMS 
were introduced. Swedish non-profit organisations are, just like Svenska 
Spel, allowed to organise games via cell phones or via the Internet, 
provided that they use the technical infrastructure of the Gambling Board. 
Since the transaction costs are rather high (a few years ago, the 
telephone company charged 50% of the costs of the tickets), non-profit 
organisations hardly make use of this option. 
As in the Netherlands the amount of advertising of gambling has 
increased significantly since the introduction of the Swedish lotto in the 
1980s, but unlike the Netherlands advertising has become a controversial 
issue in Sweden. In 2003, Svenska Spel was the sixth largest advertiser in 
Swedish mass media (Binde 2005). In October 2004 the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court criticised the marketing of Svenska Spel. 
This has led Svenska Spel to decide to decrease the marketing budget for 
2005. Based on concerns about problem gambling, in a referral requested 
by the government, the Gaming Board has denied permission to Svenska 
Spel to organise poker games via the Internet in order to be able to 
compete with international providers. However, the government has 
recently granted Svenska Spel the permission to set up a full scale 
internet poker site.  
As indicated in the preceding paragraph, in Sweden public benefit 
organisations can apply for a license to organise lotteries. The largest 




player in this field of NGOs is a group of 77 non-governmental 
organisations united in Folkspel. In 1991, Folkspel got permission to 
organise a lottery game called BingoLotto in order to raise funds for their 
members. The game is somewhat comparable to the Dutch Grote Club 
Actie (except for a weekly instead of a yearly draw): Local sports clubs 
and local organisations recruit members to sell tickets for BingoLotto. The 
person who sells tickets gets a small share of its price and the rest of the 
revenues are divided by the local club in question and the BingoLotto 
company. BingoLotto was marketed in a popular Saturday evening 
television show. However, since the popularity of the show and the lottery 
seriously declined, the timing of the show was changed to Sunday 
evenings, the anchorman was replaced and the music was changed. 
However, all these attempts to revitalize the show have failed.  
Nevertheless, this game has become the biggest game offered by a non-
governmental operator. Folkspel has been the concessionaire of 
BingoLotto since 1991, but the game concept was owned and operated by 
the company BingoLotto Sverige AB. In 2001 the Dutch company 
Novamedia bought BingoLotto Sveringe AB, but sold it in 2004 to Folkspel. 




In Sweden, just like the Netherlands, the gambling markets were clearly 
liberalised during the 1990s. Liberalisation included the introduction of 
new forms of gambling and spectacular market growth. There are, 
however, differences with respect to the popularity of types of gambling, 
the moments of introduction and the extent of innovations: In Sweden 
betting is far more popular than in the Netherlands; gaming machines and 
casinos were introduced much later in Sweden than in the Netherlands; 
and Sweden readily adopted Internet and mobile gambling, whereas the 
Netherlands are reluctant in this area of remote gambling.  
Both countries have a comprehensive legal framework for gambling, 
and gambling revenues are destined for public benefit only, with an 
exception in Sweden regarding low stake casino gaming in restaurants. In 
both countries, non-profit organisations can apply for a license to arrange 
lotteries to raise funds for their organisation, although in the Netherlands 
the Postcode lottery has been far more successful than the Swedish 
Folkspel, which is better compared with the Dutch Grote Club Actie. 




 There also is a difference in the regulation and operation of 
gambling markets. In Sweden this is less differentiated, primarily 
operated by the state and tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance. 
Also the conceptual and political distinction between lotteries and other 
forms of gambling is less pronounced than in the Netherlands. Finally we 
have seen that similar to the Netherlands problem gambling has become a 
serious issue in Sweden. Slightly different from the Netherlands is that 
this concern also affects lotteries. In particular advertising has become 
quite controversial in Sweden.  
 
 
2.4 United Kingdom 
The UK is known as one of the most liberal, but also one of the most 
regulated, EU member states regarding gambling. However, national 
lotteries have been forbidden for a long time and the National Lottery was 
not introduced until 1994, after extensive parliamentary debate. This is a 
major difference with the Netherlands, which has a long and rich history of 
the State Lottery. Compared to the Netherlands, the next thing that 
stands out is the extent of private involvement in the exploitation of 
gambling games. Bookmaking, gaming machines, casinos and bingo are 
privately operated. The UK is also known for the relatively great popularity 
of betting and bookmaking. Gambling where private profit is not allowed 
includes the National Lottery, bingo for charities and regional and local 
lotteries. The regulation of gambling in the UK is tight but differentiated. 
The current legal framework for gambling is the Gambling Act 2005, which 
will fully come into force in 2007. Small-scale lotteries were, based on the 
Lotteries and Amusement Act, allowed since 1976, but will be subsumed 
under the Gambling Act 2005. The National Lottery is based on a 
specialised act, the National Lottery Act 1993.  
Gambling is ubiquitous in the UK and strongly integrated in British 
culture. At the same time gambling is seriously debated and critically 
assessed in British policies. In this country the National Lottery was until 
recently the only gambling product for which advertising was allowed. 
Under the new Gambling Act, some of the restrictions for advertising for 
other forms of gambling are lifted. In the Gambling Review report (Budd-
report 2001) the gambling regulations were re-assessed, and following 
this report the proposed liberalisation of gambling was seriously criticised, 
notably in the Daily Telegraph. Similar to the Netherlands and Sweden, 
the prevention and treatment of problem gambling gets a lot of attention 




in the UK.  The industry has established a Responsibility in Gambling Trust 
(RIGT) to fund prevention and treatment of problem gambling. Annually, 
3 million British pounds are transferred to this fund. The British gambling 
prevalence survey estimated that 0.8% of the population are problem 
gamblers. This equates to about a third of a million people. Concerning the 
National Lottery, the debate primarily focuses on the fair distribution of 
the revenues. In 2000 Camelot won the second license, after a tendering 
competition against the People’s Lottery. The National Lottery Commission 
stated in their annual report over 2002/2001, that Camelot offered the 
best prospects to raise money for good causes.  
 
 
2.4.1 Regulatory developments 
Until the Gambling Act 2005 will fully come into force in 2007, gambling in 
the UK is operated under the 1968 Gaming Act and the 1976 Lotteries and 
Amusements Act. Re-legislation of gambling in the UK takes place, and 
this is similar to the Netherlands, because the British government 
considered the prevailing legislation too fragmented and not suitable to 
deal with technological innovations. The new Act also regulates betting 
and remote gambling. The proposed Act also foresees in eight new 
casinos: one so called ‘regional casino’, eight large casinos and eight small 
casinos. The gaming-machines are divided in various categories.  
The National Lottery has a special legal framework, the National 
Lottery Act 1993. This Act gives the state a monopoly on national 
lotteries, including instant lotteries. This law also includes a prohibition for 
bookmakers to bet on the results of the National Lottery. While the state 
holds a monopoly on the licensing of the national lotteries, a private 
company operates the National Lottery. The Lottery Act 1993 will be 
replaced by new legislation, the Lottery Bill, which is currently under 
consideration in the House of Lords. The new bill will make it easier for 
potential applicants to assess lottery money by establishing the Big 
Lottery Fund as a single body, replacing three existing distributors (the 
Community Fund, the New Opportunities Fund and the Millennium 
Commission). The bill will furthermore allow for increased public 
involvement in the Lottery with distributors given the powers to consult 
and take account of public views in making distribution decisions. Finally 
more money should go to good causes more quickly by providing for a 
new system of allocating investment income from funds in the NLDF for 
distributors. 




In 1978 Commission Rothschild already recommended the 
establishment of a National Lottery to raise additional resources for good 
causes. On the one hand, the UK felt pressed to establish a national 
lottery because of the increased competition by providers from notably 
Canada and Ireland. On the other hand there was a desire to raise 
additional funds for good causes. The reason for the monopoly position of 
the National Lottery was the fact that the lottery was primarily regarded 
as a device for raising money, and that the proceeds were for the public 
benefit, i.e. the good causes. The UK chose for a private operation of the 
National Lottery so that the design of the games, the prize structure and 
the distribution mechanism did not have to be prescribed in the Lottery 
Act. 
Supervision on gambling in the UK is quite different from the 
Netherlands. Under the Gambling Act 2005, the Gambling Commission 
(GC) will regulate all commercial gambling, apart from the National 
Lottery. The Gambling Commission issues licences and has legal power to 
monitor license holders. It can also impose fines or revoke licenses and 
can prosecute illegal gambling. As in Sweden the Gambling Commission is 
a public authority and has far more regulating powers than the Dutch 
Gambling Board (CvT). The National Lottery Commission is responsible for 
supervision of the National Lottery. 
On the basis of the Lotteries and Amusement Act (1976) also small, 
private and society lotteries are organised (charities, sports clubs, cultural 
bodies and others) to raise funds for good causes. In 2004/2005, total 
tickets sales from these lotteries were €204 million (£138.6 million). There 
were 647 registered society and local authority lotteries (Gaming Board 
for Great Britain 2005). In 2003 the Dutch venture Novamedia got 
permission from the Gaming Board to start a Postcode Lottery in 
association with a local charity lottery operator. In 2004 Novamedia got 
her own license as External Lottery Manager and launched a Postcode 
Lottery, in order to raise money for children's wellbeing and community 
regeneration in the North East. 
Regarding Internet gambling, according to the Gambling 
Commission, no website that offers online casino, bingo or machine-style 
gaming can be lawfully established in the UK. Casino, bingo and machine 
gaming are not allowed online because current legislation dictates that a 
customer must be present in the room in which gaming takes place. A 
bookmaker or betting exchange may accept bets remotely (for example, 
via interactive TV, internet or telephone), but this relies upon on a permit 




being issued by the local licensing magistrate. However, once fully 
implemented in 2007, the Gambling Act 2005 will allow operators to 
provide remote gambling facilities using equipment based in Great Britain. 
In 2001, the National Lottery Commission awarded Camelot a license to 
operate interactive games (scratch cards) via the Internet. This has been 
extended to games via mobile phones and digital television.   
Surprisingly comparable to the Netherlands, both in timing and 
objectives, is the reviewing of the gambling policies by an independent 
commission under the direction of Sir Allan Budd. The Gambling Review 
Report (Budd 2001) is comparable to the Dutch MDW-report. The general 
idea of the report was that gambling operators should be able to offer 
products and services subject to normal market conditions. Following the 
Budd-report the most significant changes would be in the casino sector, 
were the private club structure would be abolished and the market would 
be liberated, also enabling international competition. The Budd 
Commission was not charged with a review of the National Lottery; 
however, it was instructed to look at the impact of their proposals for the 
National Lottery. The commission mentions that a few proposals regarding 
lotteries, such as allowing money prizes for small lotteries, allowing 
rollovers, and raising the prize limits, might affect income for good causes 
from the National Lottery. In the government response to the Budd 
report, A safe bet for success (UK Government 2002) 157 of the 176 
recommendations have been taken over and the Gambling Act was 
amended in 2005. However, the most sweeping proposals regarding the 
liberalisation of the gambling sector have not been taken over, in 
particular regarding the casino market. 
 
 
2.4.2 Market developments  
Throughout the 1990s the UK gambling markets have also experienced 
spectacular market growth and product innovations. From 1990 to 2000 
the average weekly expenditure by British households increased from 
€2.14 (£1,45) to €5.17 (£3.50) (Budd 2001). In the UK the annual (gross) 
turnover on gambling activities is estimated to be in the region of €79 
billion (£53 billion) (National Audit Office 2005). 
In order to be able to compare the total volume of the market with our 
other sample countries, we correct the figures for casinos, gaming 
machines and bingo, using the house win or cash-in-box (the amount of 
money retained by the operators) instead of the drop (amount of money 




staked). In 2004 total net returns (gross turnover minus prizes) on the 
British gambling market thus roughly amounted to €12 billion. The house 
win for casinos was approximately €1 billion (£ 700 million), for gaming 
machines € 3 billion (£ 2 billion), and for bingo approximately € 725 
million (£500) (Gaming Board for Great Britain 2005). Net returns for the 
National Lottery in 2004 amounted to approximately €3.5 billion (£2.4 
billion). Sports and horse race betting contributed about €3.6 billion (£2.5 
billion).   
A prevalence survey shows that in terms of participation, the three 
most popular gambling activities in the UK are lotteries, especially the 
National Lottery (65%) and scratch cards (22%), followed by gaming 
machines (14%) and betting (13%). The UK has a rich and divers 
gambling market. In 2005 there were 138 club casinos, of which 25 are in 
London, which is rather unique for any capital in the world. There were 
furthermore 678 commercial bingo clubs operating and about 250.000 
gaming machines (Gaming Board for Great Britain 2005). 
The most spectacular innovation was of course the introduction of 
the National Lottery. In 1994, the tender for the operation of the National 
Lottery was won by Camelot plc, a consortium including the Royal Mail, 
Thales electronics and an American company, GTECH. In the second 
contract (2000), it was agreed that a percentage of 28% of total ticket 
sales would be transferred to the National Lottery Distribution Fund 
(NLDF), which in its turn would apportion the proceeds to individual 
distributing bodies. After the spectacular launch of the National Lottery in 
10.000 outlets, with a television show on BBC that was watched by 22 
million viewers, many new products were introduced in years after 1994. 
This includes for example scratch cards in 1995, Lucky Dip, Thunderball 
and the Millennium Draw in 1999, Christmas Millionaire maker and Lotto 
Hotpicks. After a short period of stagnation the National Lottery has 
experienced continued growth since two years. Total sales in 2004 
increased by more than €220 million to over €7 billion (£4,8 billion) 
(Camelot plc 2005).  
A remarkable shift on the British gambling markets concerned the 
fact that especially bookmakers seem to have suffered from the popularity 
of the National Lottery. This might in part be explained by the fact that 
bookmakers are not allowed to advertise (which will change under the 
new Gambling Act). But this substitution effect also seems to reveal that 
the British have, to a certain extent, used sports betting as a kind of 
numbers game (Forrest 1999; Forrest 2005).  







In the UK, just like the Netherlands and Sweden, market liberalisations 
included the introduction of new forms of gambling and enormous market 
growth. At the same time there are differences with respect to the 
popularity of types of gambling, the moments of introduction and the 
extent of innovations. Clearly, the introduction of the National Lottery was 
the most spectacular innovation on the British market. In comparison with 
the Netherlands the British lottery market has been developed rather late 
and is relatively undifferentiated. On the other hand, in the UK there is a 
greater popularity of sports betting and bookmaking than in the 
Netherlands. Altogether, the range of gambling options in the UK has 
become more comparable to the Netherlands. Also comparable to the 
Netherlands is the relatively clear distinction between lotteries and other 
types of gambling in the UK. Gambling control in Britain is tight, and 
closely associated with the state. 
 Between the UK and the Netherlands there remain nevertheless 
considerable differences in the regulation and operation of gambling 
markets. In the UK the private operation of gambling (gaming machines, 
casinos, bookmaking, bingo) is more extensive than in the Netherlands 
(gaming machines only). The exception in this respect is the National 
Lottery that is a tightly controlled state monopoly. In the Netherlands the 
lottery market is more diversified and there also is a much greater 
involvement in lotteries by civil society organisations related to the good 
causes. In both countries lotteries are only allowed to serve the public 
benefit and good causes. 
Finally, we have seen that comparable to the Netherlands the 
further liberalisation of gambling was seriously discussed. A government 
commission published a report with far reaching proposals for the 
liberalisation of gambling. Similar to both the Netherlands and Sweden is 
that in the UK problem gambling has also become a serious issue. Just 
like the Netherlands this concern is primarily focussed on casinos, gaming 
machines and scratch cards. Regarding lotteries the major and ongoing 
debate is on the fair distribution of revenues.    
  
2.5 Italy  
In this paragraph we will compare the differences and similarities between 
Italy and the Netherlands in the regulation and market development of 
gambling. Just as in the previously discussed EU member states, during 




the 1990s Italy has experienced several product innovations and 
tremendous market growth.  
In Italy the gambling sector is organised as a state monopoly that 
has contracted out the operation of gambling to private organisations, 
which have a share in the revenues. The Italian Gambling Board, 
Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli dello Stato (AAMS), is 
responsible for the entire state monopoly, but private operators are 
licensed to offer different gambling products and services. The AAMS is 
quite different from the Dutch Gambling Board (CvT), which, as we have 
seen, is merely an advisory body. The AAMS is part of the Ministry of 
Finance. The AAMS operates in Italy through regional offices that handle 
in particular the licensing of operators. The AAMS characterises the Italian 
model of gambling regulation as a new and modern way to act as a 
‘monopolist,’ by playing a role that is conducive to true market openness 
and competitiveness and that combines the protection of public interest 
with an adequate level of tax revenue. Furthermore, there are important 
spill over effects in terms of employment and added value: the sector has 
over 15.000 people who derive income from gambling: national license 
holders (with about 2000 employees), about 2000 dedicated 
establishments (bingo halls and betting shops) and 50.000 retailers.   
There are in fact three operators on the national Italian gambling 
market: Lottomatica S.p.A., SISAL S.p.A. and the SNAI group. These 
private operators all won their licenses by tendering. The games on offer 
at the national level are the Gioco del Lotto (Lotto game), Superenalotto, 
gaming machines, bingo, scratch cards, traditional (passive) lotteries and 
sports betting and betting on horse races. 
Italy does not have a single encompassing legal framework for 
gambling. This differs from the Dutch (and also Swedish and UK) 
situation. Instead, several laws and ministerial decrees regulate the 
gambling markets. The ministry of Finance can directly manage all chance 
and pool games or delegate them to private organisations. The Italian 
lotto, Gioco del Lotto, has a long history and is strongly embedded in 
Italian culture. It is the most popular game in Italy. One cultural feature 
of the Italian lotto is the so-called ‘Smorfia’.3  
                                                 
3 Smorfia means grimace and it involves the interpretation of dreams by 
associating them with numbers and then betting those numbers in the lotto. For 
example if you dream about the sea, it symbolises number 1. If it involves a 
stormy sea, it means number 10 etc. This belief is widespread in Italy. 




Prevention of illegal markets and the collection of revenues serve as 
the main motive for the regulation of gambling in Italy. This is similar to 
the other selected EU member states, but in Italy the illegal market still 
seems to be of a major concern. In 2003 the illegal market was estimated 
between €15 and €20 billion, which is almost 50% of the total gambling 
market (Pedrizzi 2003). According to the AAMS combating illegal gambling 
is done by repressive actions, but most of all by a proactive policy devoted 
to the constant improvement of offering of the public gambling. 
Prevention of problem gambling has, until now, not been a serious 
motive in the Italian regulation of gambling. The Italian Gambling Board 
acknowledges that, compared to the Netherlands, social responsibility and 
gambling addiction are relatively new issues. In Italy all initiatives 
regarding prevention of addiction and treatment are private initiatives. 
The first organisation in this field, Società Italiana per l'Intervento sulle 
Patologie Compulsive (SIIPAC), was established in Bolzano in 1990, and 
opened a national office in Rome a few years later. Although there are no 
public organisations for prevention or treatment of problem gamblers, 
according to SIIPAC the general opinion and the attitude of the state 
slowly starts to change and more attention is given to problem gambling.  
 In the Italian media, occasionally discussions arise about lotto 
mania. This discussion relates to the specific nature of the Gioco del Lotto. 
This game is quite different from lotto’s and lotteries as discussed in the 
other case studies. Contrary to the usual lotto game, the Italian lotto has 
fixed odds, so there is no jackpot. Lotto mania may occur with the ‘late 
numbers’: numbers that haven’t been drawn for at least a hundred times.   
 
 
2.5.1 Regulatory developments 
The Italian state monopoly on gambling is based on a gambling law from 
1948. In the early 1990s the Ministry of Finance was responsible for both 
the supervision and the management of the Italian Lotto. Slightly 
comparable to the denationalisation of the Dutch State Lottery in 1992, in 
1993 the operation of the Gioco del Lotto was, after a tendering process, 
transferred from the Ministry of Finance to Lottomatica S.p.A. In 1994 and 
1995 two measures enabled the enlargement of the retailers network.  
In the 1980s the foundations were laid for a radical change of the 
AAMS, a department of the ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. In 
1988 AAMS took over management responsibilities of the National 
Lotteries. In 1991 AAMS outsourced the operation of the National 




(traditional) lotteries to Consortio Lotterie Nazionale, because of 
disappointing returns.  
In 2002 the AAMS also took over the management of the betting on 
horse races and sports betting. Up to then betting on horseraces had been 
operated by UNIRE, the Italian Horse Breeding Authority, and sports 
betting had been operated by CONI, the Italian Olympic Committee. After 
2003, the AAMS outsourced the management of both sports betting and 
horse race betting to Lottomatica, Sisal and the SNAI Group. The sports 
sector and horse breed sector were suffering from competition from other 
games, especially the Gioco del Lotto, and outsourcing to private 
operators was considered to be the best way to maximise the revenues 
(Pedrizzi, 2003). 
The three private operators maintain relatively high levels of 
autonomy vis-à-vis the controlling government institutions. AAMS sets 
certain boundaries but has no direct interference in the percentage of 
payouts or marketing. Since 2002 the AAMS, is responsible for supervising 
all gambling operators. 
Because of disappointing results, in 2001 the Ministry of Finance 
organised a tender for the operation of the thirteen national lotteries and 
the instant lotteries. In 2004 a consortium, which included Lottomatica, 
won the license for these lotteries. The operation of gaming machines is 
also a state activity and delegated to private operators. In 2001, the legal 
framework for bets, odds, and pool gaming was extended with video 
lottery terminals (VLT), which can be installed in public places like bars, 
restaurants and tobacconists. Similar to Sweden, the VLTs are only token 
machines. Gaming machines that pay out cash were not allowed until 
2004 when among others, Lottomatica, SISAL and SNAI became the 
operators of a network with so-called ‘New Slots’. In Italy the revenues of 
gambling are destined for the public benefit only, including the treasury, 
sports, horse breeding and culture. The operating companies also have a 
considerable private interest in gambling, however most revenues go 
directly to the state.  
 
2.5.2 Market developments 
During the 1990s the Italian gambling market grew enormously. From 
1991 to 2004 the total gross turnovers on Italian gambling markets 
increased from €5.4 billion to €25.3 billion (casinos excluded); in 2004 the 
gaming machines, which were illegal before that time, contributed over €4 
billion (Lottomatica S.p.A. 2005). In 2003, for the entire legal gambling 




market the sales per capita amounted to €271 (Pedrizzi 2003). In 2004, 
net returns (gross turnover minus prizes) amounted to approximately 
€7.5 billion. Lotteries contributed €6.3 billion (84%), gaming machines 
contributed €722 million (9.6%) and sports and horse race betting 
contributed € 167 million (2%). Finally, bingo contributed €308 million 
(4%) (AAMS 2005c).  
The Gioco del Lotto, operated by Lottomatica, has the biggest 
market share (47%) in Italy. The sales ranking of the Gioco del Lotto 
belongs to the highest in the world (Lottomatica S.p.A. 2005). If we add 
the 2% of the game Tris, also run by Lottomatica, this company covers 
almost half of the legal market. Lottomatica furthermore extended the 
number of draws of the Gioco del Lotto. In 1996 a second, mid-week draw 
was added in order to raise funds for culture and heritage. In 2005, the 
AAMS gave permission for a four months pilot with an extra draw of the 
lotto, bringing the total on three per week. 
Second in market share (with 7%) is the game Superenalotto 
offered by SISAL. Superenalotto is a lottery game based on the results of 
the Gioco del Lotto. The SISAL run game Totocalcio has lost market share 
over the last few years. According to the AAMS, this loss has to do with a 
change in the game concept: betting used to be only on Sundays, but is 
now more spread out over the week. The National Lotteries are two of a 
kind, first the traditional lotteries (passive lotteries, similar to the Dutch 
State Lottery) and the instant lotteries, the Gratta e Vinci. The traditional 
lotteries are connected to one or more historical, artistic, cultural or other 
local events, and the maximum number is fixed to thirteen a year. The 
lotteries are all paired with television programmes. The Consortio Lotterie 
Nazionale operates these national lotteries.  
Only recently, in 2001, the Ministry of Public Revenue introduced 
Bingo on the Italian market. Today, Bingo is played in approximately 420 
bingo halls; since 2005 there also is single national jackpot. Betting in 
Italy is possible on horse racing and other sports. Casinos in Italy are not 
a national but a municipal responsibility. The four casinos in the north of 
Italy (Val d’Aoste, San Remo, Venezia and Campione) are, for historic 
reasons, operated under municipal authority. In addition there are plans 
for a casino in central Italy. The Italian Gambling Board is not involved in 
the policies nor in the supervision of casinos. A new financial law in 2004 
allowed for the first time gaming machines with prize payout in money, 
the so-called ‘New Slots’. Since November 2004, these kinds of machines 
have been attached to a network operated by Lottomatica, SISAL and the 




SNAI Group. New financial legislation also meant a gambling tax rise for 
the Gioco del Lotto and the Superenalotto from 3% to 6%, starting from 
January 2005.  
In Italy there seem to be no marketing and advertising restrictions. 
The maximum costs for marketing are negotiated with the individual 
operators. SISAL exploits its own television network within the retailer’s 
shops to promote the games. Furthermore, especially re-branding of horse 
racing in 2000 (Varenne Campaign) and the scratch cards (2003) were 




Since 1990, also in Italy there have been clear market liberations. This 
included product innovations, market differentiation and enormous market 
growth. The differences with the Netherlands can be related to the 
popularity of games, the moments of introduction and the extent of the 
innovations. The Italian market was extended with more lotto draws, 
scratch cards, betting games, gaming machines, bingo halls and also 
some legal (municipal) casinos. Dominant on the Italian gambling market 
is the Italian Lotto, the Gioco del Lotto. It is not only dominant in terms of 
popularity and revenues, but also the regulatory and operational model 
seems exemplary for a large part of the Italian gambling market, except 
for perhaps the few legal casinos. The typical high-risk games like gaming 
machines and scratch cards all seem to be relatively recently introduced 
on the Italian market. Typical for the Italian situation regarding gambling 
seems to be a rather extensive illegal market. 
 The most striking difference between the Italian and the Dutch legal 
gambling sector is the regulatory model. In Italy there is no central 
gambling act. The organisation of gambling is a state monopoly and 
almost all revenues directly go to the treasury. In this respect the 
liberalisations of the 1990s consisted of the contracting out of the licenses 
to private gambling organisations that seek to maximise the revenues. 
This situation is comparable to the Dutch State Lottery and the Dutch 
casinos. So, compared to the Netherlands, Italy has a one-dimensional 
regulator model for gambling markets. In the Netherlands (and also in 
Sweden and the UK) we find more variation, including private exploitation 
in the field of gaming machines and the involvement of the civil society in 
lotteries. Because of the one-dimensional regulatory system the 
conceptual and regulatory distinctions between lotteries and other 




gambling markets are less pronounced then in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, prevention of illegal markets and state revenues are the 
central motives of Italian gambling policies. Problem gambling is an issue 




Since the ending of the communist regime in 1989, the Hungarian 
gambling sector has expanded significantly, both in terms of the legal 
provisions and in terms of market growth. The differences with the Dutch 
gambling sector are, similar to the Italian case, rather substantial. The 
lotto and toto were even modelled after Italian examples.  
During the communist regime, since 1957, the biggest bank of 
Hungary, the OTP, managed in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, 
the Totó and the Lottó games. The legal framework for gambling today is 
the Act on the Organisation of Gambling (1991), which gives the state a 
monopoly on gambling and enables the state to delegate management to 
private organisations. According to this Act the organisation of lottery 
games, the operation of gaming machines, the operation of a casinos and 
activities aiming at the organisation of horse race bets, can only be 
organised with a concession (Hungarian Parliament 1991).  
At the national scale level various types of gambling games are 
offered. As in the Netherlands, the operation of gaming machines is 
privatised. Casinos are also privately operated, although the state 
company Szerenscejáték Rt runs three of the six casinos. Szerenscejáték 
Rt was established in 1991 to take over the operation of toto and lotto 
network from OTP. 
The primary aim of gambling regulation in Hungary is the 
prevention of illegal markets. Fraud was, according to the Gambling 
Board, in 1995 the main argument to amend the Act on the Organisation 
of Games, and to give Szerenscejáték the monopoly on all drawing 
games. Problem gambling is hardly an issue in Hungary, despite the fact 
that there are plenty of gaming machines and casinos, which in the 




2.6.1 Regulatory developments 
Before the Gambling Act of 1991, in Hungary there was no specific legal 
framework for gambling. Gambling was regulated by government orders 




and decrees. It was authorized by the Ministry of Finance and Commerce, 
in cooperation with the tax office and customs protection. When the 1991 
Gambling Act was adopted and Szerenscejáték Rt was established, several 
companies were set up to operate the drawing- and numbers games. A 
specific Gambling Fund was established to distribute part of the gambling 
revenues to good causes, in particular sports. The operation of gaming 
machines was privatised. At that time casinos were not allowed. 
In 1995 the Hungarian state decided to get a firmer grip on lottery 
games. The Act on the Operation of Gambling was amended and 
Szerenscejáték got a monopoly on all lottery games. At the same time, 
the Gambling Fund was abolished and most of the licenses of gambling 
operators were cancelled. While state officials claim that the main reason 
for the abolishment of the Gambling Fund had to do with fraud, and with 
problems related to controlling the distribution process, critics claim that 
the huge budget deficits of the state were the main reason. According to 
these critics, the state simply claimed the gambling revenues. After the 
elections of 1995, as a result of the Bokrospackage, a financial restriction 
policy of the state, all public funds were liquidated (Bodo 2004). 
Currently, the Hungarian state intends to revise the Gambling Act, mainly 
directed at the provisions for gaming machines and casinos.  
 
 
2.6.2 Market developments 
Since 1991 the Hungarian gambling sector has experienced an enormous 
growth, also in comparison with the surrounding Eastern and Central 
European countries. From 2001 to 2004 total revenues increased from 
€300 million to €590 million (Szerencsejáték Rt 2004; Szerencsejáték Rt 
2005). When Szerenscejáték Rt was founded, it offered the toto pools, the 
5/90 lotto, 6/45 lotto, instant lotteries and a kind of bingo game called 
Bongo. The first decade the games were operated mechanically, but in 
2001 all lotteries switched to online games. In a few years time, this 
technological advancement made it possible to launch several new 
gambling products. In 2003 the jackpot became as high as € 19,2 million 
(over HUF 5 billion). Since 2001 six casinos have opened.  
The national lottery is the 5/90 lotto. Even though this game has a 
lower pay out (45%) than many other games, it is the most popular 
game. The other drawing games also contribute highly to the turnover of 
Szerenscejáték Rt: 85% of total revenues come from drawing games; 
10% from sports betting and 5% from scratch cards. Since 1997, the lotto 




draws are marketed in a television show. Tickets for the national lottery 
are sold in lottery shops similar to the English betting shops. The 
popularity of this game may, according to Szerenscejáték Rt, have to do 
with the strong tradition of the Hungarian gambler to buy the tickets and 




In Hungary gambling markets have also been liberalised and expanded 
significantly. Initially, in the early 1990s the market was rather liberal and 
characterised by a combination between operation by Szerenscejáték Rt 
on behalf of the state and private exploitation. A considerable amount of 
the revenues also went to a public gambling fund. However in 1995 a shift 
occurred in which the state took firmer control over gambling operations 
and its revenues. In this respect the Hungarian regulatory model differs 
from the Netherlands and is more inclined towards the Italian situation. In 
Hungary the state also claims the gambling revenues, although in the field 
of gaming machines and casinos a considerable amount of private 









This chapter deals with the second research question. We will discuss the 
role of the state and the civil society in the distribution of gambling 
revenues. In this chapter the Netherlands will again serve as a benchmark 
in our comparison between Sweden, the UK, Italy and Hungary. In our 
analyses we distinguish between the allocation of gambling revenues and 
the organisations that benefit from gambling ventures. Gambling revenues 
can be generated and divided in quite different ways. In this respect the 
state often has a double role. The state generally holds, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, controlling power over gambling, but in many cases 
the state also directly profits from gambling, from the revenues and/or 
from gambling taxes. The state can furthermore transfer the revenues to 
public benefit, good causes and charity organisations. However, the state 
can also license private or civil society organisations. In that case the civil 
society can directly generate and distribute gambling revenues. This is for 
instance the case with charity bingo or with lotteries organised by social 
associations or NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) serving specific 
causes and the public benefit.  
Although in some cases there can be revenue sharing in the 
markets of casinos, gaming machines or bookmaking, these markets 
generally are either organised as state monopolies or as (taxed) private 
ventures. Because we have a special interest in the involvement of the 
civil society we will in this chapter mainly focus upon lotteries. To which 
extent are revenues distributed to civil society organisations and to which 
extent do the member states allow NGOs to organise lotteries in order to 
raise money for their good causes? The sports sector is the only sector 
that benefits in all countries, although the extent to which it benefits 
varies over the EU member states. Starting with the Netherlands, in the 
next paragraphs we will discuss for each sample country the differences 
and similarities regarding the allocation of gambling revenues and the 
organisations who benefit from gambling.  
 
 




3.2 The Netherlands 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Dutch lottery market is 
rather divers. The State Lottery is denationalised but its revenues all go to 
the treasury.  On the other extreme we find the “National Good Causes 
Lotteries” (NGCL) that generate revenues for civil society organisations. 
We have also seen that on this end of the spectrum the Grote Club Actie 
yearly organises a lottery together with, and on behalf of, many small 
associations. In between the extremes of state and civil society, we find 
the Lotto, Sports Toto and Instant lottery organisation (SNS), which 
organises drawing games for its shareholders, of which the sports sector 
is the most significant. In the Netherlands the state also gets a share 
through gambling tax. All prize winners in lotteries have to pay a 25% 
gambling tax on prizes exceeding €454.- 
 The NGCL generates the most revenues on the lottery market. 
Although the State Lottery has the highest gross returns it generates less 
revenues because it pays out a higher percentages of prizes to its players. 
In 2004, a Government Commission did some proposals to increase the 
fairness, the flexibility and the transparency in the distribution of lottery 
revenues (Schuyt, 2004). In the Netherlands civil society organisations 
get hallmarks to assure that they are properly run.  
The Dutch civil society is one of the largest in the world: in 1995, it 
represented 14.4% of the total economically active population, and about 
15% of GNP (Salamon 1999). The composition and role of the Dutch civil 
society finds it roots in the process usually indicated with the concept 
pillarization - the segmentation of society along religious and political 
lines, that shaped the relationship between the state and civil society 
organisations (Therborn 1989). Leaving the provision of crucial services to 
non-profit organisations affiliated with different political and religious 
groups accommodated different religious and ideological camps. By doing 
this, the state restricted its role to financing these services. 
The principle of leaving responsibilities, if possible, to the civil 
society is to a certain, and because of current deregulations even 
increasing, extent a guiding principle in Dutch government policies. In the 
Netherlands this principle has always kept the profile of the state rather 
low, while the growth of the post war welfare state increased the public 
support to the civil society. In 1995 the largest part of finances for the 
civil society came from the government (59%), followed by fees and 
charges (39%) and philanthropy (2%) (Salamon 1999; Salamon 2004). 
NGOs in the field of international aid represent a small part of the civil 




society (3%). The larger part of the Dutch civil society is made up out of 
organisations in the field of public health (48%).  
 
 
3.2.1 The allocation principles 
Since revenues from lotteries are considered public money, the state 
intervenes in the distribution of lottery revenues and sets provisions in 
lottery licenses. A license can only be obtained if the revenues serve the 
public benefit. From each lottery at least 50% of the turnover must be 
regarded as revenue and destined for the public benefit. The total amount 
of prizes and other costs related to the operation and marketing of a 
lottery may thus not exceed 50% of the turnover. In order to decrease 
the competitive advantage of the State Lottery and to harmonise the 
market, in 2004 the percentage of the revenues that the good causes 
lotteries have to contribute to their good causes has been reduced from 
60% to 50%(College van Toezicht op de Kansspelen 2005). The current 
minimum percentages that have to be allocated for the public benefit of all 
Dutch lotteries are: 20% for SENS, 23% for SNS and 50% for NGCL.  
In the Netherlands there has been considerable debate over the 
harmonisation of prize and revenue percentages (MDW 2000). However, 
the government decided that the lotto and state lottery games should 
keep their position as lotteries with a high percentage for prizes, while 
charitable lotteries should keep their position as lotteries with a high 
percentage for good causes.  
There is also considerable variation between the lottery 
organisations regarding the distribution of revenues. In the case of the 
State Lottery the Ministry of Finances decides about the revenue 
percentage (currently 20%) as well as the spending. The SNS books the 
revenues to civil society Funds, of which the Dutch sports foundation and 
Olympic committee (NOC*NSF) are the most important. These Funds 
decide about the actual distribution of the money. In the case of the NGCL 
the money is distributed by the lottery organisations but also goes to civil 
society Funds like the DOEN Foundation. The license of the good causes 








3.2.2 The benefiting organisations 
In the Netherlands, the state still benefits the most from gambling. In 
2004, a total amount of approximately €646 million went to the treasury. 
This amount consists of €142 million revenues from the State Lottery and 
€65 million gambling tax on prizes(College van Toezicht op de Kansspelen 
2005). In addition the state collected €268 million on the casinos and 
approximately €171 million VAT on gaming machines (KPMG 2004). 
In 2004, the lotteries raised a total amount of €378 million for the 
civil society. The majority of this comes from the NGCL, which contributed 
€314 million. Table 1 gives an overview of the shares of different sectors 
of the civil society that profit from lotteries.4 The sector that benefits the 
most is international aid and human rights.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of net revenues to good causes from all lotteries in 
2004 in the Netherlands 
 Shares Million € 
International cooperation and human rights 34% € 126  
Nature and environment 25% € 94  
Welfare 14% € 51  
Culture 9% € 34  
Public health 5% € 21  
Sports (incl. Horseracing) 13% € 52  
   
Total 100% € 378  
Source: CvT, Annual Report 2004. 
 
The Postcode lottery raises funds for (international) human aid and the 
natural environment. The seven initial beneficiaries of the Postcode 
Lottery all receive a fixed percentage of the first €100 million, and another 
fixed percentage of all amounts above €100 million.5 In 2004, €125 
million (55% of revenues) went to these seven beneficiaries, while €100 
million (45%) was divided over 50 other civil society organisations. The 
DOEN foundation received the majority of revenues, €26 million. This 
particular foundation is a distribution fund that provides funding to 
                                                 
4 National Good Causes Lotteries (Postcode lottery, Sponsor lottery, Bank Lottery) 
and the Lotto, which includes the Sports Toto and the Instant Lottery.  
5The Dutch Refugee Council, the Dutch Society for Preservation of Nature, Oxfam 
the Netherlands, DOEN foundation, Médicins sans Frontières, World Wide Fund 
and Unicef 




organisations in the field of international sustainable development, welfare 
and culture. The Sponsor Lottery raises funds for sports, welfare and 
public health. This lottery raises money for two groups of beneficiaries. 
Annually, the Board of Commissioners decides upon the beneficiaries. 
Since the 1960s the Bank Lottery raises funds for culture and welfare 
organisations. In 2004, the 23 beneficiaries of this lottery received  €47 
million. As mentioned earlier, these three lotteries are all part of the 
holding NGCL. 
The SNS (the combined Lotto, Sports Toto and Instant Lottery) 
raises money for sports and also for welfare, public health and culture. In 
2004 the SNS distributed, from the €62 million net revenues, €45 million 
to funds for sports and physical education (74%); the remaining €17 
million was destined for culture, welfare and public health. From the 
Instant lottery, 65% (€8 million) went to sports funds, and 35% (€4 
million) to funds in the fields of culture, welfare and public health 
organisations (De Lotto 2005). These percentages have historical roots. 
All beneficiaries of the Lotto are formally represented in a beneficiary 
council. This council is part of the Board of the Lotto and has powers that 
are similar to those of a general assembly. 
The annually organised Grote Club Actie enables several 
associations, foundations and other institutions in the fields of sports, art, 
culture or other forms of mental and physical development to participate 
in a nationally organised lottery, in order to raise money for their 
purposes. In 2004 7200 clubs participated in this lottery and together 
they raised €6.7 million. 
 
3.2.3 Conclusion 
In the Netherlands, our benchmark study, gambling is connected to the 
wider society in divers ways. All kinds of productive relationships profit 
from gambling: gaming machines contribute to the private sector; casinos 
and the State Lottery contribute to the state; and the Lotto, Sports Toto, 
The Instant Lottery and the Good Causes Lotteries all contribute directly 
or indirectly (mediated by Funds) to civil society organisations. On all 
markets the state also gets a share through gambling tax or VAT. In the 
field of lotteries there now is a fairly even share between revenues for the 
state and revenues for the civil society. This relates to the expansion of 
the lottery sector with the NGCL. 
 






In the previous paragraph we have discussed the distribution of gambling 
revenues in the Netherlands. We have seen that, although the state 
benefits the most from gambling, non-profit organisations also benefit to a 
large extent, and even that in the field of gaming machines private profits 
are allowed. In this paragraph we will compare the allocation principles 
and the distribution of revenues in Sweden with the Netherlands. Similar 
to the Netherlands, gambling revenues are going both to the treasury and 
to civil society organisations. Different from the Netherlands (and the UK) 
is that in Sweden private organisations hardly profit from gambling. 
A general characteristic of Swedish service production is that, 
compared to other countries, the Swedish non-profit sector is relatively 
small (Lundstrom, 1995). The Swedish non-profit sector is also less 
developed in the fields of health and social services, and more developed 
in the areas of culture, leisure, and advocacy.  
The civil society workforce is 7.1% of the economically active 
people, which is considerably low compared to the Netherlands (1.4%) 
(Salamon 2004). Furthermore, the majority of the financial resources 
(54%) comes from philanthropy, 32% comes from fees and charges and 
15% from the public sector (compared to 60% in the Netherlands). 
Social movements play a major role in shaping both the Swedish 
non-profit sector and state policies (Therborn 1989). Similar to the 
Netherlands, the history of the Swedish non-profit sector is largely one of 
its relation to the state. During the 20th century, due to the growth of the 
welfare state, many activities were taken over by the state. A distinct 
feature of the non-profit sector in Sweden is the high degree of 
membership among the population (both in absolute and relative terms), 
notably cooperatives, sports associations and trade unions (SOU 1997). 
Umbrella organisations, especially in the labour market and older 
cooperative movement, are very common.  
 
 
3.3.1 The allocation principles 
The state owned Swedish gambling operator Svenska Spel organises a 
wide range of gambling products, lotteries, bookmaking and gaming 
machines (VLTs). In addition, the four casinos are operated by a 
subsidiary of Svenska Spel. The revenues of all these gambling activities 




directly go to the treasury, with an exception of the entire revenue from 
the VLTs that are earmarked for youth organisations. 
As in the Netherlands, local or regional authorities also grant 
(temporary) licenses to civil society organisations for local or regional 
lotteries, provided that they raise revenues for the public benefit. In order 
to be granted a license to operate a lottery (or bingo game), the Lottery 
Act (1994) defines that ‘the value of lottery prizes corresponds to at least 
35% and not more than 50% of the value of the stakes’(Swedish 
Parliament 1994). Different from the Netherlands, in this respect, is that 
the Swedish state only prescribes the percentage for prize payout. No 
percentage is defined for net returns nor costs, other than that ‘the lottery 
will give the applicant reasonable revenue and that this will be used for 
the relevant object of public benefit’ (Lottery Act 1994, article 16). Any 
organisation that applies for a license at the Swedish Gambling Board 
makes a proposal for the percentages of prizes (between 35% and 50%), 
for costs and for the percentages of revenues (‘reasonable’) that will go to 
the good causes. The logic of this principle is that the optimal percentages 
are determined in competition between lottery operators.  
Different from the Netherlands is furthermore that non-profit 
organisations do not pay (gambling) taxes. Gambling taxes are only 
imposed to horse racing (11% on gross turnover). 
 
 
3.3.2 The benefiting organisations 
The Swedish state, the horse breeding industry and several civil society 
organisations receive shares of the revenues from gambling operations 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Distribution of gambling revenues in 2003 in Sweden 
 Share Million € 
The treasury 44% €529  
Redistribution to good causes 12% €142 
Good causes lotteries (incl. Bingo) 32% €387  
Horse racing industry 12% €148 
   
Total 100% € 1.206  
Source: Lotteriinspektionen (2005) 
 




The Swedish state clearly benefits the most from gambling. Beside the net 
revenues from Svenska Spel, the revenues consist of gambling tax on 
horseracing (11%) and VAT from the 139 restaurant casinos (low value, 
low stake gambling in restaurants; in 2003 €46 million). From these 
sources, in 2003 the Swedish state received a total of €529 million. The 
majority comes from Svenska Spel (€395) and taxes generated by betting 
on horse races (€128). 
Not all revenues from Svenska Spel, however, go to the state. 
There is some redistribution of the revenues, in 2004 worth €142, to civil 
society organisations. The profit from the VLT’s operated by Svenska Spel 
(in restaurants and in Bingo halls) also is to the benefit of the civil society. 
In 2004, an amount of  €107 million went to the Swedish Sports 
Confederation and €16 million went to the Swedish National Board for 
Youth Affairs. In the period 2003-2006, a significant proportion of the 
revenues of Svenska Spel, €107 million (SEK1 billion) is earmarked for 
sports organisations. Furthermore the revenues from scratch cards 
(Penningloten) are partly distributed to civil society organisations. €80 
million (which is 1/26) of the scratch cards revenues were contributed to 
art, theatre and other cultural purposes. Moreover, the bingo halls 
alliances are operated by NGOs. In addition also the revenues from the 
VLTs that are placed in bingo halls go to these NGOs. In 2004, this 
amounted to €18 million (Lotteriinspektionen 2004).  
Besides these redistributed revenues by the state, civil society 
organisations also generate and distribute revenues from gambling 
themselves. The relatively great popularity of horse racing and betting in 
Sweden contributes significantly to the civil society. In 2003 the revenues 
of betting on horse races were €148 million and are all destined for the 
horse breeding industry itself. 
A divers range of civil society organisations gets contributions from 
Folkspel, other NGO lotteries and bingo. In 2003 these games together 
raised €387 for good causes. According to the Swedish Gambling Board it 
is clear that the sports sector benefits the most from these revenues, 
although they cannot give percentages for the different social purposes 
that benefit from these gambling ventures. The biggest good causes 
lottery is ‘BingoLotto,’ operated by Folkspel. About 80% of the member 
organisations of Folkspel are sports organisations. In 2000 BingoLotto 
generated €117 million but this amount seriously dropped to €77 million 
in 2004. As mentioned in the previous chapter this was partly due to a 
decline in popularity of the BingoLotto Show. BingoLotto has spend a large 




amount of money on marketing, but this could not persuade people to 
view the show to the extent that they did earlier. Besides Folkspel, there 
are a couple of other organisations that organise lotteries on a regular 
basis. In 2003, there were 62 regional or national lotteries arranged by 30 
NGOs, raising a sum of  €27 million. The bingo halls also contributed €27 
million to NGOs. 
Among the largest NGOs are A-lotterierna (a lottery raising funds 
for the social democratic party), Ideella Spel,6 the Cancer foundation 
(Cancerfonden) and Lottericentralen7. Lottericentralen is a service 
organisation that runs about 10 to 15 lotteries a year for different NGOs. 
The largest lottery is the lottery for the Swedish Red Cross, one of the 
owners of Lottericentralen. Other owners are a Swedish welfare 
organisation Stadsmissionen, the Children Cancer Fund 




In Sweden gambling is connected to the wider society in divers ways, 
which is comparable to the Dutch situation. However, the range of this 
diversity is more limited, and there are also considerable differences in the 
relative sources of gambling games. In Sweden the private sector hardly 
shares in gambling revenues and Svenska Spel is a completely state 
owned company. The civil society gets a somewhat bigger share from 
gambling revenues than the state, if we include horse racing, 
redistribution mechanisms and good cause lotteries. Compared to the 
Netherlands, the various sectors of the civil society rather unevenly share 
in gambling revenues; in particular the sports sector gets a relatively big 
share in Sweden.  
 
                                                 
6 Ideella Spel is a service organisation. The license is granted to four non-profit 
organisations: the Union of the Blind (Synskadades Riksförbund), the Swedish 
National Association for the Deaf (Sveriges Dövas Riksförbund), the Swedish 
Society for Nature Conservation (Svenska Naturskyddsföreningen) and the 
Frisam. In 2004, gross turnover was about €6 million, of which €1.2 million  
(20%) goes to the non-profit organisations.  
7 For the Cancer foundation and Lottericentralen the percentage of net turnover is 
higher than for Ideella Spel, approximately 30%, but the gross turnover is lower: 
in 2004, gross turnover of the Cancer foundation was between €4.0-€ 4.2 million. 
Net turnover was approximately €1,8 million. 




3.4 United Kingdom 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, on the UK gambling markets 
there is a relatively large involvement of the private sector, which also 
shares in the profits. This private involvement includes bookmakers, 
casinos, bingo and gaming machinery. On these markets the state only 
shares in the revenues via gambling taxes. The introduction of the 
National Lottery in the UK not only meant a diversification of the gambling 
market with a new category of gambling products, it also meant an 
enormous extension of civil society interests in gambling. One of the 
reasons for establishing the National Lottery in the UK was precisely to 
raise additional resources for good causes. However, this ‘… lottery has 
undeniably failed the additionality test […]’ (Bodo 2004). This means that 
in the UK there is significant debate over the substitution effect of the 
lottery, in which the lottery to a certain extent covers causes, which were 
previously taken care of by the state. Research has shown that 
government spending on the arts, media and sports have fallen since the 
introduction of the National Lottery (Reith 2002). Nevertheless, the 
National Lottery is the major gambling organisation in the UK that 
contributes to the civil society. Since the establishment of the National 
Lottery almost €25 billion (£16 billion) has been raised for good causes.  
The British civil society is dominated by education & research and 
culture & recreation organisations. In 1995, the UK non-profit sector 
employed just under 1,5 million full time equivalent paid workers. These 
employees account for over 6% of activity in the economy as a whole, 
meaning that the non-profit sector employed more workers than the 
largest single institutional employer, the National Health Service, which 
employed in 1995 1,1 million workers (Salamon 1999). If we include 
volunteers in this, the percentage amounts to 8.5% of total employment 
(compared to 14.4% in the Netherlands) and 6.6% of GNP. This is 
comparatively low and partly caused by a rather great involvement of 
voluntary work in the civil society. The government contributes 47% of 
the financial resources; fees and charges cover 44% and 9% is 
contributed by philanthropy. 
In the next paragraph we will take a closer look at the allocation 
principles of the gambling revenues. After that, we will look at the 
organisations that benefit from the National Lottery.  
  
 




3.4.1 Allocation principles 
All (net) returns from the National Lottery go to good causes. The 
Department for Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS) defines the framework 
for distribution of these revenues. Similar to the Netherlands, the state is 
closely involved in the choice of sectors that benefit from gambling 
revenues. The sectors that receive funding from the National Lottery have 
to be approved by Parliament. The operator Camelot plc is not involved in 
the distribution of revenues, neither is the National Lottery Commission, 
its regulator. Camelot transfers the agreed amount of revenues, which is 
28% of total turnover, to the National Lottery Distribution Fund (NLDF). 
The NLDF divides the revenues to civil society funds and distributing 
bodies.8 The 28% share in turnover for the good causes or public benefit 
is significantly more than the Dutch State Lottery (15%) but significantly 
less than the Dutch Good Causes Lotteries (50%). 
The overall funding of the civil society has become considerable 
higher than envisioned prior to the launch of the National Lottery in 1994. 
Also new (categories of) beneficiaries have been favoured under lottery 
revision and legislation implemented after the 1997 elections, which were 
won by labour. After its first big review, entitled The People's Lottery 
(1997), an additional distributor was created, the New Opportunities Fund, 
receiving 33% of all revenues. This change reflects a close link between 
government policy and the distribution of lottery revenues, since the focus 
is on health, the environment and education, which are all high political 
priorities (Bodo 2004). 
The new Lottery Bill, which is currently under consideration, names 
a few objectives regarding the distribution of revenues from the National 
Lottery. One of the objectives is to make the National Lottery more 
responsive to people’s priorities and to ensure that lottery money goes 
efficiently to good causes. To realise this, the number of distributing 
bodies (currently 14) will be reduced, and increased public involvement 
with distributors will be allowed, to take account of public views in making 
distributing decisions (Department for Culture Media and Sports 2005). 
In 1999, the QUEST team (Quality, Efficiency and Standards Team), 
which was established to investigate the performance and quality of 
publicly funded bodies, published two reports on the distribution of lottery 
                                                 
8 The Big Lottery Fund, the Heritage Lottery Fund, the Millennium Commission, 
UK Film Council, UK Sport, Arts Council England, Sport England, Arts Council for 
Northern Ireland, Sport Council Northern Ireland, Sports Council for Wales, Arts 
Council Wales, Scottish Arts Council, Scottish Screen and Sports Scotland. 




revenues (Quest team 1999). It concluded that the distribution process of 
the National Lottery was too much of a (financial) burden for applicants of 
relatively small lottery grants, up to €148 thousand. For applicants of 
larger grants, time, flexibility, transparency and support were issues that 
were highlighted. These concerns are somewhat similar to the Dutch 
debate on the distribution of lottery revenues (Schuyt 2004). 
Different from the Netherlands is that the percentage of revenues 
for good causes is not laid down in a law, but negotiated with the 
operator. Of the total sales of the National Lottery, 50% is prize money, 
28% is returned to the good causes, 12% is paid for levies, 5% is 
returned to the retailers, 4.5% is operating costs, and 0.5% is returned to 
Camelot plc. In the next paragraph we will have a look to which extent the 
state and civil society organisations benefit from gambling. 
 
 
3.4.2 The benefiting organisations 
In the UK both the state and the civil society benefit from gambling. The 
state benefits from taxes and levies from all commercial gambling and this 
includes also levies from the National Lottery (12% of total sales). Civil 
society benefits from the revenues from the National Lottery, they benefit 
from the revenues from local and regional lotteries and bingo, and from 
betting.   
In 2004/2005 the state received an amount of  €860 million (£583 
million)  in taxes and levies from commercial and non-commercial 
gambling.9 From the revenues of the National Lottery, in 2004/2005 
approximately  €2 billion was distributed to the good causes; which was a 
5% increase compared to the previous year. In addition to this huge 
amount of money, several charities received gambling revenues for a total 
amount of €111 million (£75 million) from regional lotteries, the so-called 
society and local-authority lotteries (Gaming Board for Great Britain 
2005).  
In 2004/2005, total ticket sales of the charity lotteries were  €205 
million. There were 647 registered society and local authority lotteries. Of 
the ticket sales around €44 million (21 %) went on prizes, around €54 
million (26%) went on expenses and the remaining €111 (53%) went to 
the ‘good causes.’ 
                                                 
9 In the UK the financial year is from March to March. 




The majority of the revenues from the National Lottery, 50%, were 
distributed to organisations in the field of health, education, environment, 
community and charity. The sports sector, arts and heritage all received 
1/6 (16.7%) of the revenues. These percentages have been established 
by Parliament. The agreed sums are transferred by the NLDF to the 
individual distributing bodies. These distributing bodies decide 
autonomously who receives money. Distribution is primarily demand led: 
organisations can submit applications at the individual distributing bodies. 
These distributing bodies not only allocate money from the National 
Lottery, but also other state subsidies. Furthermore, civil society 
organisations are supported by various initiatives from private operators, 
such as from BACTA (the trade organisation for the leisure machines 
industry) that has established a Charitable Fund for good causes. Between 
2001-2003, BACTA members raised approximately €315 million (£213 
million) (see website of BACTA) Bookmakers make, next to compulsory 
payments, voluntary donations to the greyhound industry, which 
amounted to approximately €12 million (£8 million) in 2004. Under new 
arrangements, bookmakers will pay 0.6% of their turnover (See website 




Until the introduction of the National Lottery the benefits from gambling 
for civil society organisations were rather limited. Compared to the 
Netherlands, in the UK there historically is a great private sector 
involvement and a reliance on gambling taxes for the state. With the 
introduction of the National Lottery, the gambling shares between private, 
public and civil society organisations have become more even. The 
distribution of the huge amount of benefits for good causes covers a wide 
range of civil society organisations, and is in this respect somewhat 
comparable to the Dutch lottery market. Civil society organisations 
furthermore benefit from local and society lotteries and from contributions 
of the industry. There are, however, also some striking differences 
compared to the Netherlands, in particular, the lack of shares for 









The Italian state has a key role in the organisation of gambling markets. 
However, different from the Netherlands, gambling control seems rather 
week and the private companies that operate the gambling markets have 
a considerable financial interest in gambling. The involvement of the 
Italian civil society in gambling markets is rather weak.  
In general the Italian civil society is relatively small compared to 
the Netherlands (Salamon 1999). In 1999, the Italian civil society 
represented 3.1% of GNP (compared to 15% in the Netherlands). 
Furthermore, it represented 3.8% of the total workforce (compared to 
14.4% in the Netherlands). In spite of the substantive growth of the civil 
society workforce between 1991 and 1999 (adding as many as a quarter 
of a million FTE jobs, which represents a growth rate of 5% per year), the 
scale of Italian civil society has lagged behind compared to other western 
European countries.  
Civil society organisations have their roots in the social welfare and 
educational institutions created by the Roman Catholic Church, and in the 
mutual aid societies created by workers at the beginning of the industrial 
development of the country (Salamon 2004). In the beginning of the 
1980s, budgetary limitations, combined with dissatisfaction with state-run 
welfare services, led to the establishment of new forms of civil society 
organisations: volunteer-based associations that refused to be 
represented by the Church, as well as a variety of new ‘social 
cooperatives’. The public image and legitimacy of Italian civil society is 
according to Salamon (1999) still strongly connected to traditional 
institutions, especially the Church, the state, and political parties, and 
their success depend on their financial autonomy, professionalisation and 
political legitimacy. 
The majority of civil society organisations, 62%, focus on service 
activities.  Among the organisations with an expressive role (35%), 
cultural, sports and recreation organisations dominate (24%). This is 
more than the Netherlands (17%), but less than the UK (28%), Sweden 
(46%) and Hungary (37%). Similar to Sweden, the Italian civil society 
depends heavily on fees and charges (61%), contrarily to the Netherlands 
and the UK, that depend mostly on government payments (59% and 47% 
respectively). A further characteristic of Italian civil society is the absence 
of umbrella organisations, which highlights a relatively low degree of 
sector integration.  
 




3.5.1 The allocation principles 
Contrary to the Netherlands, the Italian law does not allow for non-profit 
organisations to organise lotteries to raise money for their own 
organisation or other good causes. The majority of the revenues of all 
forms of gambling go to the treasury and the operators. However, part of 
the revenues is transferred to the Ministry for Heritage and Cultural 
Activities, to the sports sector, including horse racing, and to some 
smaller cultural and social activities.  
 In the Italian system there is a certain amount of earmarking. In 
1996, Italian Parliament allowed an additional weekly draw of the Italian 
Lotto, especially for the benefit of ‘the restoration and preservation of 
cultural, archaeological, artistic, archival and library goods’. The standard 
draw is on Saturdays and this additional draw is on Wednesdays. In 2001, 
parliament added landscape restoration to the projects allowed to funding 
through this lottery (Law 29/2001). The amount earmarked for culture is 
not a fixed percentage of the revenues. All revenues of the Wednesday 
draw go to the good causes, with a maximum of €150 million per year. 
The money is transferred to the Ministry for Heritage and Cultural 
Activities. This Ministry allocates the lottery resources by triennial plans to 
various projects. 
The revenues from horse racing and sports betting are for UNIRE 
(horse breeding) and CONI (Olympic Committee) respectively. The 
Financial Law 2004 has established that in the period 2005-2008 CONI will 
receive an annual fixed amount of €450 million. Furthermore, this law 
earmarks 14% of the totalisator game for UNIRE, 2004 approximately 
€320 million.  
There are, different from the Netherlands, no legal provisions for 
prize payouts or costs. Such percentages are negotiated between the 
Italian Gambling Board, the AAMS, and the operators, Lottomatica, SISAL 
and SNAI. The distribution of gross revenues from the Gioco del Lotto is 
as follows: prize pay out is approximately 50%, retailers get 8% and 7% 
is for Lottomatica. The treasury gets 29% revenues and 6% gambling 
taxes. The distribution of gross revenues of Superenalotto: prize pay out 
is 38%, 8% is for the retailers, 6% is gambling tax, and around 5% is for 
the operator SISAL. For the traditional lotteries and instant lotteries, prize 
payout is 50%, 8% is for the retailers, 12,4% for the operator Consortio 
Lotterie Nazionale and 2% fee for the Gambling Board. For the gaming 
machines with money prizes, the so-called ‘New Slots’, 75% is prize pay 
out, 13.5% is taxes and 11.5% revenue for the operator.  




3.5.2 The benefiting organisations 
The Italian state is the largest beneficiary of gambling in Italy. However, 
similar to the Netherlands, (parts of) the revenues (and/or taxes) from 
sports betting and betting on horse races go to the sports sector and the 
horse breeding industry. Gross turnover of the Italian gambling sector 
amounted to almost  €25 billion (2% of the GNP) in 2004. This meant 
€7.5 billion in net returns for the state and for the sports sector, horse 
racing and some minor social and cultural activities (through the national 
lotteries).  
Sport activities are financed through game, bets and pools 
competition, and amounts to €450 million a year in the period 2005-2008 
(AAMS 2005).  
The percentage of the totalisator game established in the financial 
law 2004 for horseracing is 14%, which meant approximately €320 million 
in 20004.  
Part of the revenues from the Italian Lotto is earmarked for 
restoration and heritage projects, as described in the previous paragraph. 
In 2003, the categories eligible for funding were extended to ‘cultural 
activities’ (instead of only capital projects), which makes among others 
cinema and performing arts eligible for funding. The maximum of €150 
million per year did not change.  
Italian civil society organisations (other than the sports and horse 
racing sector) also benefit from gambling for example through the 
solidarity campaign “An Euro for a Child” (“Un Euro Per Un Bambino”), 
promoted by the Bambino Gesù Paediatrics Hospital, in collaboration with 
Lottomatica and the Federation of Italian Tobacconists. On all lottery 
tickets encompassing the logo of the campaign, wagers can check a box 
to donate one, five or ten euro for the construction of a new children’s 
hospital. Wagers can also choose to donate parts of their winnings, up to 
€100, or they can donate directly at the tobacconist. The campaign is 
marketed in national newspapers and on national television and raised 
over €1,1 million in 2004. 
Finally, most private operators have a considerable share, and 
therefore an interest in the maximisation of, the revenues of gambling. 
The impression that in Italy only the state has an interest in gambling 
markets is therefore somewhat misleading. In 2004 Lottomatica achieved 
net revenues of €585 million and SISAL €186 million. The operating costs 
still need to be deducted from these amounts.   
57 






Although the Italian state has a central role in gambling markets and 
indeed gets the larger share of the gambling revenues, in practice there is 
a wider involvement of a range of productive forces that profits from 
gambling. First, the operators, to which the state has contracted out the 
exploitation of gambling, have a considerable private interest in almost all 
forms of gambling. Second, there is some earmarking of gambling 
revenues for specific causes (culture, sports, horses), and some 
redistribution from the state and/or operators by means of sponsoring to 
civil society organisations. Also different from the Netherlands is the 




In this paragraph we will look at the distribution of gambling revenues in 
Hungary, the central European and new EU member state in our sample. 
The Hungarian situation is characterised by a combination of state 
operated lotteries, betting and bookmaking, and the private operation of 
casinos, gaming machines, amusement centres and promotional drawings. 
The civil society hardly shares in gambling revenues. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, after the ending of the communist regime, a Gambling 
Fund was established to transfer part of the gambling revenues to civil 
society organisations. However, in 1995 this Gambling Fund was 
abolished. We will discuss this in the next paragraph. After that we will 
focus on the organisations that now benefit from gambling in Hungary. 
First we will outline the civil society structure of Hungary. 
Generally speaking, Hungary has the smallest and youngest civil 
society of the five sample countries. Hungary has a non-profit share of 
employment 1.1%, compared to 14.4% for the Netherlands and 8.5% for 
the UK (Salamon 1999). Compared to other Central and East European 
countries, however, Hungary has one of the better-developed civil 
societies (e.g. the non-profit share of total employment in Slovakia in 
1995 was 0.9% and Romania 0.6%). After the Law on Associations was 
adopted in 1989, several Western donors helped developing the 
Hungarian civil society by offering funding: USAID, FID-UK (British Know 
How Fund), several funds like Ford Foundation, SOROS Foundation, and 
some Japanese funds all contributed to the establishment of different 
organisations. Nearly 40% of all non-profit employment in 1995 was in 




the sector of culture and recreation (the latter includes sports). Compared 
to the European average of 14.4% this is a high percentage. This situation 
reflects the heritage of the communist past, during which culture and 
recreation were the only fields of social activity that were encouraged. 
Only 12% of the organisations are established before 1990 (mostly 
organisation for sports and recreation). The cultural field is dominated by 
newer organisations, but they have not attracted the same levels of 
employment and money as the sports and recreation organisations.  
Salamon c.s. (1999) give different explanations for the structure of 
the Hungarian civil society. First, there always has been a strong tradition 
of ‘oppositional’ movements. Second, voluntary organisations have always 
exerted considerable influence on social and economic policies. And third, 
in the first half of the 19th century, an extensive system of cooperative 
partnerships emerged between local government and private foundations 
and supporters co-financing a variety of public welfare institutions.  
 
 
3.6.1 The allocation principles 
As outlined in the previous chapter, in 1991 when the Hungarian Gambling 
Act was adopted and next to the establishment of the state operator 
Szerenscejáték Rt and the Gambling Board also a Gambling Fund was 
established. This Fund was intended to distribute part of the gambling 
revenues to civil society organisations. In the period from 1991-1995 
actually 6% from the totalisator and the drawing games was transferred 
to the Gambling Fund. The organisations that benefited from this were in 
the fields of health care, social, culture, education, youth and sports. After 
a strong lobby of the sports sector, in 1993 the Fund was divided into two 
separate funds: the National Game Fund and the Sports Fund (for sports 
and horse racing). A council of experts from each field, charged by the 
Minister of Finance, allocated the grants. 
The Sports Act currently prescribes which percentage from the 
gambling revenues has to go to sports. This is 12% of the drawing games, 
50% of bookmaking and the complete game tax of the Toto games. These 
revenues are managed and distributed to sports organisations by the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs and the National Sports Bureau. 
Gambling tax has been a topic for discussion in Hungary. Different 
from the Netherlands, the amount of gambling tax in Hungary is not the 
same for all gambling games (Gaming Board of Hungary 2005). In 2004, 
the state decided to raise the percentages of gambling tax. The gambling 




tax for lotteries went from 17% to 24%. Taxes on scratch cards have 
been reduced from 27% to 12%. This made it possible to raise prize 
payout from 44% to 60%. The only state revenues on casinos (€40 million 
returns in 2004) and slot machines (€278 million returns) come from 
taxes (€13 and €136 million respectively). 
  
 
3.6.2 The benefiting organisations 
In the period from 1991 to 1995, health care, social, cultural, educational 
and youth and sports, all benefited to some extent from gambling through 
the grants from the Gambling Fund, and, after 1993, from the National 
Game Fund and the Sports Fund. Since the abolishment of these Funds, 
the gambling revenues go directly to the treasury, with the exception of 
an earmarked percentage for sports and the private revenues of casinos 
and gaming machines. 
In 2004 the Hungarian state received in direct returns €272 million 
from the lotteries (€246) and betting games (€26). The taxes yielded 
€245 million gambling taxes and €42 million personal income taxes. The 
gambling taxes are primarily generated by slot machines (€136 million) 
and drawing games (€89 million). Personal income tax is primarily 
generated by the lotteries (€35 million). There are some additional 
revenues to the state. The Act on the State Budget 2004 prescribes that 
the Gambling Board has to pay an amount of €8.16 million into the state 
budget. The Hungarian Gambling Board furthermore has the power to 
sanction license holders that deviate from the rules. Fines imposed to 
operators of gaming machines, amusement centres and promotional 
drawings are also a source of income to the state. In 2004 this was an 
amount of €1.5 million.  
From the state revenues about €82 million was redirected to sports, 
on the basis of the sports act. Since 1995 the rest of the civil society has 
no more obtained revenues from gambling directly. Although civil society 
representatives in some cases strongly disagree with this backwash and 
the current distribution policy, they also seem to accept this resignedly as 
a fact of life. 
Similar to the Italian solidarity campaign of Lottomatica, 
Szerenscejáték has some activities regarding donations, support and 
sponsoring. During the middle of the 90´s, the state operator issued some 
scratch tickets with a charity purpose. The tax had to be paid to the 
specific charity instead of to the state budget. According to the Hungarian 




Gambling Board, this was terminated due to problems that occurred with 
the control. In 2005, Szerenscejáték has made arrangements to put some 
areas in a number of hospitals at the disposal of a network of disabled 
persons, to sell lottery tickets from there. Current legal arrangements 
make it impossible for Szerenscejáték to donate part of its revenues 
directly to non-profit organizations, but 1% of annual turnover, goes to 
charity (health, sports, culture). Applications from charity organizations 
are directly submitted to Szerenscejáték, where a special Charity 
Committee decides on who gets what and how much.  
 
 
3.6.3 Conclusion  
After 1995 the Hungarian civil society has not shared in (the growth of) 
the gambling markets, except for a constant share of the sports sector. 
This preference for sports in part reflects the communist past. The 
relatively small share of the civil society is a major difference with the 
Netherlands. And while the Hungarian state apparently seizes the 
revenues of lotteries and betting, it only gains revenues from casinos and 










This chapter deals with the third research question. We will discuss the 
international, in particular the European, relations and processes in the 
development of gambling markets. In the previous chapters we have seen 
that in al the sample countries the regulation of gambling was considered 
to be a national responsibility and that gambling markets to a 
considerable extent are nationally protected. At the same time, however, 
the national gambling markets to a greater or lesser extent, and in 
various respects, were liberalised and expanded significantly. In this 
chapter we will analyse how the EU relates to this contradictory 
development. Recently, in the context of the service directive, the 
regulation of gambling in the EU has become a serious topic of debate. In 
February 2006 the European Parliament decided that gambling would be 
excluded from the scope of the service directive. This means that it has 
become unlikely that the EC will pursue the harmonisation of gambling 
markets. However, the EC insists that EU members comply with the EU 
Treaty, and has therefore started infringement procedures against a 
number of member states for restricting the supply of sports betting 
services.10  
The composition of this chapter is different from the preceding 
chapters. This chapter is not composed around the five member states of 
our sample. Instead we will look at various scale-levels in the governance 
of gambling in the EU. In this multi-level governance approach (Hooghe 
2001) we will first focus on the regulatory level of the EU, and discuss the 
responses of the EU to the liberalisation, technological innovation and 
expansion of national gambling markets. Second, we will focus on the 
national level of gambling regimes, and discuss the responses within the 
five national gambling regimes to the European developments. Finally, we 
will focus on the organisational level of international organisations in the 
field of gambling, in particular regarding operators and regulators. 
 
 
                                                 
10 See EC press release IP/06/436, ‘Free movement of services: Commission 
inquires into restrictions on sports betting services in Denmark, Finland, 







4.2 The European Union 
The EU is emerging as a new regulatory force in the field of gambling. The 
recent decision regarding the service directive does not imply that 
gambling is excluded from the single market. Operators from abroad are 
increasingly entering national markets, in particular by way of the 
Internet. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) plays a 
crucial part and puts pressure on the European Commission (EC) and on 
national jurisdictions. We will start this paragraph with discussing the EU 
policies regarding gambling. Subsequently we will have a closer look at 
the jurisprudence by the ECJ. 
 
4.2.1 Gambling and the internal market 
In 1991, in the context of the European strive towards a single market, 
the EU ordered a study on the desirability of European regulation for 
gambling markets (Commission of the European Communities 1991; 
Beckers 1992). The next year, at the EU summit in Edinburgh, the 
European council of heads of states and prime ministers decided that, 
based on the outcomes of the study and on the principle of ‘subsidiarity,’ 
that gambling markets were not suited for harmonisation on the European 
level. From 1992 onwards ‘subsidiarity’ became the political paradigm for 
regulating gambling on the level of the EU. It means that as long as the 
national regulation of a particular market is regarded as more effective 
and efficient, the EU will not interfere. Consequently the EC always has to 
give convincing arguments as to why a market is better regulated at the 
EU than at the national level. 
The idea that the regulation of gambling is best served at the 
national level has been put into question in the context of the ‘service 
directive,’ based on articles 43 and 49 of the EU Treaty. In 2004 the EC 
proposed the service directive in order to eliminate the obstacles to the 
freedom of establishments for service providers and the free movement of 
services between the member states. This directive will give both the 
providers and the customers the legal certainty they need to exercise 
these two fundamental freedoms of the EU Treaty. 
Most crucial (and controversial) to the service directive was the 
country of origin principle (Commission of the European Communities 
2004), which implied that member states are not allowed to restrict 
services from a provider established in another member state. This in turn 
could lead to ‘regulatory competition’ between the member states. 







regulations to the country with the most lenient prescriptions, in order to 
prevent service providers from moving out or to attract providers from 
abroad.  
The crucial issue in the debate on gambling and the service 
directive was whether or not gambling should be regarded as an ordinary, 
normalized, ‘product’ or ‘service’, to which no special restrictions apply. 
However, European Parliament considered gambling not in all cases or 
circumstances to be a completely normalized service. As a result of the 
exclusion from the service directive, it is not likely that the EC will come 
with proposals on harmonisation of gambling markets.  
In relation to the service directive the EC commissioned a research 
to investigate the barriers in the 25 member states of the EU for 
harmonisation of gambling markets. The goal of this study was: ‘to asses 
whether each of the existing barriers imposed by the laws of the Member 
States to restrict free movement of gambling services in the Internal 
Market could be held to be justifiable according to existing principles of 
European Law’ (Sychold 2005).  
Obviously, if harmonisation of gambling were to become a reality, 
the continuation of national gambling monopolies would become 
impossible. Since gambling markets will be excluded from the service 
directive, real market harmonisation has, in the short term, become 
unlikely. However, a legal dimension accompanies this political dimension. 
The jurisprudence of the ECJ on the issue is expanding and puts pressure 
on the EC and on national jurisdictions.  
 
4.2.2 Gambling and the European Court of Justice  
The freedom of establishments for service providers and the free 
movement of services have been a reason for some member states to ask 
the ECJ for a pre-ruling, to find out whether or not their national 
legislation is compatible with European law. In three key judgments, 
Schindler, Laara and Zanetti, it seemed that national monopolies were not 
endangered by article 43 (freedom of establishment) and 49 (freedom of 
services) of the EU Treaty. We will explain this briefly. 
In 1994 in the Schindler case, the ECJ had to decide whether the 
UK could keep out advertisements and tickets from German lotteries. The 
ECJ held that given the peculiar nature of lotteries, even though they are 
considered ‘services,’ the UK could restrict or prohibit lotteries from other 
Member States, provided that those restrictions were not discriminatory 







prohibition of nation wide lotteries. In 1999 the Schindler case was 
extended by the Laara case. The Finish state prosecuted mister Laara who 
was, on behalf of a British company, operating slot machines without a 
Finish license. Where the Schindler case concerned services (i.e. the 
lottery), this case concerned goods (i.e. slot machines). The ECJ ruled 
that the Finish law was not discriminating against non-Finish residents, 
and that Finish law in this case was consistent with European law. Also in 
1999, in the Zanetti case, the Italian state asked the ECJ for a pre-ruling. 
Zanetti accepted bets on sports by fax and Internet as an intermediary for 
the British company SPP. Again, the ECJ ruled that the Italian state was 
entitled to restrict the operation of betting on sports. In both these cases 
the ECJ ruled that the considerations set out in the Schindler case were 
applicable to other forms of gambling.  
 The leading principle is that in these cases national restrictions are 
justified because of the special nature and features of the gambling 
products and services, and the public interest considerations such as 
prevention of fraud and crime. Hence, the ECJ observed that national 
gambling regimes should be assessed by reference to their own objective 
(Golderos 2005). If these objectives are effectively pursued, any 
restriction could lawfully be an exception to the community freedoms.  
The first case involving gambling via Internet was in 2003 the 
Gambelli case. This case is generally considered a landmark case. The 
Italian judge asked for a pre-ruling from the ECJ in the case of Gambelli 
and 137 others, who acted as an intermediary for the UK licensed 
bookmaker Stanley International Betting. The Italian court raised 
questions regarding the ‘proportionality’ of the adopted policy (repression 
of crime) and the objective pursued (condemning Gambelli). The Italian 
court also suspected that there could be a contradiction between the 
national monopoly on the operation of betting and the expansive 
marketing aimed at increasing the funds for sports and horse breeding 
(Verbiest 2004). In this case about Gambelli the ECJ decided that the 
national court should determine whether restrictive  
‘…legislation, taking account of the detailed rules for its application, 
actually serves the aims which might justify it, and whether the 
restrictions it imposes are disproportionate in the light of those objectives’ 
(European Court of Justice 2003).  
The Gambelli case stressed that national courts have to decide upon the 
issue and that restrictions, in particular national monopolies, on gambling 







interpreted in various and even opposite ways (Ringelstein 2004). The 
proponents of market liberalisations concluded that bookmaking could be 
part of the freedom of establishment and services. Others, those in favour 
of gambling monopolies, concluded that governments are indeed allowed 
to prohibit foreign betting sites. 
According to the advocate-general Alber of the ECJ, the Italian 
monopoly on sports betting failed the required justifications on the 
grounds of public interests (Verbiest 2004). Although the ECJ not formally 
concluded that the Italian state was infringing the freedoms of the EU, the 
court seems to have restricted the margins of national authority. This 
could possibly necessitate the harmonisation of national legislation in the 
field of gambling. However, others claim that harmonisation is neither 
necessary nor adequate, because the public interest is differently defined 
in all member states (Vlaemminck 2005). 
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
The EU indeed emerges as a new regulatory framework for gambling 
markets, but not because gambling has become the subject of market 
harmonization. Gambling was excluded from the service directive. 
However, gambling is part of the internal market and the EC insists on 
compliance with the EU treaty. The debate has also moved from the 
political issue of ‘subsidiarity’ to the legal issue of ‘proportionality.’ This 
means that national restrictions (i.e. monopolies) are only allowed if the 
restrictive policies are convincingly applied. It is precisely regarding this 
point that the national market liberalisations and expansions, as discussed 
in chapter two, may be at odds with the European legal framework. The 




4.3 National jurisdictions 
It is important to include the national level in any analysis of European 
developments, because national regimes both influence the EU and 
manage the consequences of European policies in the field of gambling. 
There are clear differences in the extent of international involvement and 
in the positions taken by the gambling authorities and operators in the 
five EU member states of our sample. In this paragraph we distinguish 
between foreign competition on national markets and the national 








4.3.1 International competition 
The Dutch gambling sector clearly experiences foreign competition, also 
via Internet. In 2004 total expenditure on foreign gambling games in the 
Netherlands was estimated at €67 million (Vermeer 2005). The majority 
of the foreign games in which the Dutch participate are German lotteries 
(84%). Participation still mostly takes place by mail, although participation 
in Internet games is increasing (11%). Recently, the Ministry of Justice 
decided to take hold of illegal gambling via Internet, after over 450 illegal 
games and 200 portals offering digital gambling were traced (Korps 
Landelijke Politiediensten 2003). In addition Holland Casino will be given 
an experimental monopoly on Internet gambling for a period of two years. 
Similar experiments are taking place in Italy and Hungary. The Hungarian 
state announced the first state organised game, playable exclusively via 
Internet, to be presented in 2005 (Gaming Board of Hungary 2005). The 
Italian state also intends to run some experiments. The Italian Gambling 
Board is currently investigating the possibilities for experiments with 
games on mobile phones and television.  
The Swedish market also experiences foreign competition. Unibet 
opened an office in Stockholm in 1997. Although the Lottery Act prohibits 
foreign operators to advertise their products in Sweden, international 
companies like Ladbrokes and Unibet are widely present in Swedish mass 
media, which has led to several law suites against national newspapers. 
Unibet, Expekt and other UK bookmakers also actively advertise their 
products on television. Most of these channels are broadcasted from the 
UK (Cisneros 2005). In 2004 in Sweden estimated sales for Internet-
based international operators were €0.6 billion (Svenska Spel 2005). This 
foreign penetration of the market forced the state operator Svenska Spel 
to increase its budgets for advertising.  
In Hungary, according to the Hungarian Gambling Board, there 
have so far been two companies that have offered gambling via Internet, 
which was explicitly directed at Hungarian citizens. Since this concerns a 
criminal activity under Hungarian law, the Hungarian Gambling Board has 
attempted to track these companies down. After inquiries at the British 
Ministry of Culture, Media and Sports, it appeared to be an English 
registered operator Sporting Bet and a Gibraltar based operator Bet and 
Win. The Hungarian Gambling Board has taken no legal steps against 









4.3.2 National responses 
Gambling authorities as well as operators from EU member state are in 
several cases actively resisting operators from other member states. In 
the Netherlands, the Dutch Lotto organisation (SNS) recently won an 
important lawsuit against the British bookmaker Ladbrokes (Rechtbank 
Arnhem 2005). In this long-standing dispute with Ladbrokes the Lotto 
claimed that Ladbrokes violated Dutch gambling law by offering betting 
games to Dutch citizens. Ladbrokes in its turn claimed that by granting a 
monopoly on betting to the SNS Dutch law violated article 49 of the EU 
Treaty on the freedom of services. In august 2005 the Court of Arnhem 
ultimately decided, in reference to the Gambelli case, that the exclusive 
right of the Lotto did not violate the EU Treaty, and that Ladbrokes 
therefore had to bar Dutch citizens from betting on its sites.  
This case not only makes clear that national governments are 
allowed to protect gambling markets. It also makes clear that this 
protection in fact depends on the national gambling policies. In a pre-
judgement in this particular case the court of Arnhem explicitly ordered 
the Dutch government to provide a convincing account about the 
credibility of Dutch gambling policies, which according to Ladbrokes had 
become increasingly liberalised. In response the Dutch minister of Justice 
wrote that after 2003 Dutch gambling policies had become far more 
restrictive than might be expected on the basis of Dutch gambling policies 
in the foregoing years. This whole procedure makes clear that in the 
context of European law liberalisations in national gambling regimes itself 
pose a threat to the gambling monopolies. In a way these monopolies 
may paradoxically become ruined because of their own success. A recent 
ruling of the Court in Breda (Rechtbank Breda 2005) , this time 
concerning the position of Holland Casino, reaffirms this: the Compagnie 
Financière Regionale referred to European rules against monopolisation in 
case against the Dutch state, after the Dutch ministry of Justice and the 
ministry of Economic Affairs refused to award a license for exploiting a 
casino. Again, the state is commissioned by the Court to prove that the 
policy of assigning a monopoly position to Holland Casino is consistent and 
systematic. A similar case was recently addressed by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, which decided in a case against Oddset that 
also in Germany restrictive measures are not always effected and 







In Sweden foreign companies that seek to penetrate the Swedish 
gambling market are also actively resisted. Following a decision of the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden in 2004, foreign companies are 
no longer allowed to have any campaigns or adds in Swedish media. In 
December 2004, as a reaction on the Gambelli case, Svenska Spel decided 
to cut back their marketing budget by 20%. In 2005 the Swedish 
Supreme Court also ruled that Ladbrokes was not allowed to offer Internet 
gambling in Sweden. Due to the increased offer of foreign operators, in 
2004 the Swedish government started an investigation to develop a 
proposal on how Swedish regulation can be improved in relation to 
technological and international developments (Svenska Spel 2005).  
In Italy the Strategy department of the Italian Gambling Board 
(AAMS) has set up an International Gaming Observatory to study and 
monitor the international gaming market, in terms of regulation, taxation 
and marketing to ‘defend or develop the national market’ (AAMS 2005b). 
Although the Italian government prefers national regulation of gambling 
markets, this makes clear that the AAMS is currently evaluating its 
position on harmonisation. 
An example of regulatory competition can be found in the case of 
the UK, which experienced revenue loss from the UK licensed bookmakers 
that had moved to Gibraltar, Malta and other places with favourable tax 
conditions. In an attempt to get the bookmakers back, the British 
government announced to eliminate the tax on bets (6.75%) and to 
replace it with a new tax of 15% on the gross profits of bookmakers 
(Nelson Rose 2000). The licensed bookmakers would be required to return 
to the UK.  Operators who refused would not be allowed to advertise in 
the UK. 
 Within the various EU member states we do not find uniform 
positions regarding market harmonisations, and not all positions on this 
issue are equally developed and clear. In the Netherlands there are 
different and opposite views in the debate on harmonisation. The Ministry 
of Justice states in its third progress report on gambling policies that the 
gambling market should be protected because it should not be treated as 
an ordinary economic market (Ministerie van Justitie 2005). The Dutch 
gambling board also believes that the (national) control of gambling 
markets should be the major policy objective, and not the increase of 
gambling revenues. As we have seen in the Netherlands the Lotto and 
Sports Toto organisation (SNS) clearly opposes and actively resists foreign 







Good Causes Lotteries (NGCL) favour harmonisation in the field of 
lotteries, provided that this improves the options of civil society 
organisations in other member states to participate in lotteries and to 
share in the revenues. This would imply a legal status for good causes 
lotteries, in which a fixed percentages of the returns should be for the 
good causes and independent bodies should arrange the distribution of 
these revenues. The NGCL also maintains, and this is similar to many 
other lottery organisations, that in European gambling policies the low-risk 
lotteries should be clearly distinguished from the high-risk gambling 
games. 
In particular in the UK we find explicit and clear advocates of 
market harmonisation on the level of the EU. These advocates (for 
example European Betting Association; eba.com) usually stress the 
benefits for the consumer. They compare betting to for instance the 
sectors of telecommunications and power supply. The European 
harmonisation of these markets has given consumers the benefits of lower 
prices and a wider choice of products and suppliers. The high revenues for 
the state (in taxes) are also used as an argument for the harmonisation of 
betting markets. The Association of Remote Gambling Organisations 
(ARGO) stresses that the restrictions on gambling are primarily meant to 
protect domestic gambling providers and tax revenues, while increased 





All member states of our sample, and most likely all EU member states, 
experience competition on gambling markets from operators of other EU 
members. International competition is not new but is accelerated because 
of the use of high tech media like mobile phones and most significant the 
Internet. What is new is that this competition takes place in the unclear 
regulatory framework of the EU. The responses in the five member states 
are still ‘under construction’ but vary from proponents of harmonisation to 
defensive responses. What is becoming clear is that the current EU 
regulations and jurisprudence reinforce restrictive policies, if national 









4.4 International organisations 
In this paragraph we will look at the organisational level of international 
relations. In anticipation of, and as a reaction on, European 
developments, regulators and operators, participate in various 
international organisational networks. Three types of networks seem 
particularly relevant, networks of regulators the Gaming Regulators 
European Forum (GREF), networks of operators like European Lotteries 
(EL), and a network regarding knowledge and research, the European 
Association for the Study of Gambling (EASG). We will briefly discuss 
these networks. Following this we will also highlight the emerging forms 
cooperation between operators in offering games together.  
 
 
4.4.1 European organisations 
In 1989, the Gaming Regulators European Forum (GREF) was established, 
on the initiative of the Gambling Board for Great Britain and the former 
Board for Casino games in the Netherlands. The regulators from six 
European countries met for the first time to discuss gambling regulation in 
several European countries. Today, the GREF consists of representatives 
from gaming regulatory organisations throughout Europe.  The objectives 
of GREF, according to its constitution, are both to provide a forum for 
gaming regulators and to represent, on special occasions, the views of 
European gaming regulators. Regulators from different countries 
participate in working groups on technical issues, information and 
statistics, problem gambling and illegal gambling. Common standards are 
defined and best practices are copied from each other. Our sample 
countries are all members of GREF. Hungary and Sweden were the latest 
to join GREF, they became members in 1993 and 1995 respectively.  
European Lotteries (EL) is an important but only one of several 
organisational networks of gambling operators in Europe. There are for 
instance similar organisations for casinos and gaming machines. EL has a 
dual objective comparable to GREF. It not only wants to construct 
networks and share information but also wants to exert influence. EL 
takes in particular position against the liberalisation or harmonisation of 
gambling markets. EL states that  ‘… it’s clear that liberalization will cause 
very serious social problems and will increase the possibility of gambling 
addiction’(European Lotteries 2004).  EL was founded in 1999 and is a 
cooperation of state lotteries and totes within Europe. Although EL is 







some of the members are, as we will point out in the next section, already 
cooperating and jointly offering lottery products.  
Another form of networking takes place in the conferences of the 
European Association for the Study of Gambling (EASG). This association 
offers a forum to discuss and exchange ideas related to gambling. A wide 
range of stakeholders, such as regulators, operators, suppliers, 
researchers and others, attend its conferences. The EASG aims to be a 
forum for the systematic study, discussion and dissemination of 
knowledge about all matters relating to the study of gambling in Europe. 
In recent years problem gambling and responsible gambling played a 
central role in the debates of EASG. 
 
 
4.4.2 European gambling games 
Of our sample countries the British operator of the National Lottery, 
Camelot, participates in the first European lottery called Euromiliones. 
This lottery was started by Camelot, les Française des Jeux (France) and 
Loterias y Apuestas del Estad (Spain), with the first European draw in 
February 2004. Currently nine countries participate.11  
The licenses of the Dutch operators explicitly prohibit such 
international activity. In 2004 the Dutch Lotto and Sports Toto 
organisation (SNS) tried to participate in Euromiliones, but the Dutch 
state didn’t allow this (De Lotto 2005). Novamedia, the company that 
developed the format of the Postcode Lottery, recently launched a 
(regional) Postcode Lottery in the UK, and a national Postcode Lottery in 
Sweden, Svenska Postkodlotteriet. The Postkodlotteriet will cover the 
whole of Sweden, and it will cooperate with TV4, a big national 
(commercial) television station. The license to organise the lottery has 
been issued to three big Swedish non- profit organisations united in Ideeel 
Foreening.12 Notable is the fact that the beneficiaries are all internationally 
operating NGOs.  
Another example, also in Sweden, shows that international 
cooperation between beneficiaries can take different forms. In 2002 the 
Spanish operator ONCE decided to help the Swedish Union for the blind 
(Synskadades Riksförbund), when Ideella Spel suffered from increasing 
                                                 
11 France, UK, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Portugal, Ireland and 
Austria.  
12 World Wide Fund (Världsnaturfunden), The Children’s Cancer Foundation 







competition from Svenska Spel. Today, ONCE still has a share of 70% in 
Ideella Spel.  
Svenska Spel is also exploring options for international cooperation. 
In 2005 Svenska Spel announced the establishment of a new business 
area, called Svenska Spel International, which focuses on commercial 
cooperation with state controlled or regulated lotteries and gaming 
operators in Europe. Svenska Spel already offers together with Norway, 
Iceland and Finland, a lottery game called Viking Lottery.  
The Italian state does not participate in international lotteries or 
other gambling forms. However, in 2001 Lottomatica acquired a 50% 
stake in the Spanish bingo leader, Global Bingo Corporation (GBC) 
(Unknown journalist 2001). Meanwhile, however, Lottomatica has sold this 




On the European level there are clearly organisational network structures 
emerging in the field of gambling. These networks include operators, 
regulators and researchers. These networks are highly relevant for 
developing market standards and influencing (European) regulation. In 
addition also specific European games and forms of corporate cooperation 
are being developed. These initiatives express European integration in the 
field of gambling but also highlight major differences in the opportunities 









In this chapter we will answer the research questions. Since this is a pilot 
study that represents an exploratory investigation, the answers will have 
the status of hypotheses and new or more detailed questions, rather than 
clear and complete answers. This study will also hint at possible future 
directions regarding gambling and the development of lottery markets and 
the distribution of revenues, rather than offer explicit prognosis and well-
developed scenarios. 
 In the preceding chapters we have tried to determine in which ways 
and to which extent national gambling regimes of the EU members 
experience liberalisations, how gambling and in particular lotteries relate 
to the civil society, and also how the European level affects national 
gambling regimes. We have explored these questions in five case studies: 
the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, Italy and Hungary. The idea behind this 
selection was to compare contrasting cases within the EU. We can 
conclude that within this sample we have indeed found, besides a range of 
minor differences, a variety of structural contrasts in gambling regulations 
and market developments. 
The most important restriction of this study obviously is the limited 
sample of countries. Because of the range and extent of the differences, 
we believe that it is not accurate to consider this study as representative 
for the entire EU. However, the study offers a set of indicators that could 
very well be applied to other countries as well. We also believe that an 
approach with regional clusters seems promising, i.e. comparing Eastern 
and Central European, Mediterranean, Nordic and Atlantic countries. In 
our comparison the Netherlands served as a benchmark case. This was 
because it is tricky to define in advance absolute standards for market 
‘liberalisations’ or the ‘involvement’ of civil society organisations. 
However, this approach unmistakably leads to a certain ‘ethno-centric’ 
bias, in the sense that what counts as ‘liberal’ from the Dutch perspective 
may very well pass as ‘restrictive’ in Italy. A further characteristic of the 
benchmark is that the research for the Netherlands has been more 
extensive than for the contrasting cases. In this respect all of the case 





specific market segments and lottery organisations, the reasons and 
legitimations for regulations, the involvement of civil society 
organisations, and the development of organisational networks on the 
European level. The pilot study points in the general direction that the 
four contrast countries, as outlined below, can be tentatively classified 
with respect to two dimensions: market liberalisations and regulatory 
complexity.  
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The pilot study has substantiated the initial impressions that gambling 
markets and policies have been liberalised in the recent past. 
Furthermore, the social and economic significance of gambling, and the 
benefits of lotteries for the state and the civil society in particular, have 
increased tremendously. Finally, the EU indeed emerges as a new level of 
regulation in the field of gambling. The study not only substantiates these 
European developments, but also offers analyses of the variations, the 
dynamics and the processes that are relevant for explaining and 
understanding the (differences in) developments that occur on various 
gambling markets. Following the initial research questions, it is to these 
considerations that we will now turn. 
 
 
5.2 Similarities and differences 
In chapter 2 we have seen that during the 1990s and the recent past, in 
all of the sample countries gambling markets have been liberalised. 
However, the nature and extent of the liberalisations and the liberalisation 
processes are not equal in these countries. In order to analyse the 
similarities and differences we distinguish, following Hay, between 
‘common trajectories’ on the one hand and processes of ‘convergence’ and 





In the case of a common trajectory two (or more) regimes move into the 
same direction. Liberal and conservative gambling regimes can both be 
characterised by an increasing significance of market forces; i.e. by a 





We have seen that all sample countries are characterised by the common 
trajectory of market liberalisation. In the benchmark case, the 
Netherlands, liberalisation included the extension of gambling legislation 
enabling more products to be exploited. The liberalisation also included 
spectacular market growth, increasing competition, market differentiation, 
product innovation and marketing expenditures. After 2000, however, in 
the Netherlands the spectacular market expansion came to an end and 
many liberalisation initiatives were dropped or postponed. There were also 
serious backwashes on the Dutch gambling markets, notably related to 
concerns over increasing market competition and problem gambling 
related to gaming machines and casinos. 
In the five contrast cases, liberalisations also included the 
introduction of new forms of gambling and spectacular market growth. 
But, as we have seen, at the same time there are serious differences with 
respect to the popularity of types of gambling, the moments of 
introduction, the extent of innovations and the extent of speed of growth. 
In Sweden and in the UK betting is for instance far more popular than in 
the Netherlands. In its turn lottery markets and casinos are comparatively 
early and well developed in the Netherlands. And regarding the popularity 
of good causes lotteries the Netherlands stand out as pretty unique. 
Different is also that the backwashes that occurred in the Netherlands did 
not, or not yet or to the same extent, happen in the contrast cases. In 
Sweden liberalisation and market expansion seem to continue. In 
particular Sweden and the UK readily adopted Internet and mobile phone 
gambling, whereas the Netherlands and the other contrast cases seem 
reluctant or lagging behind in this new market segment. Remote gambling 
is a market in which divergence rather than convergence seems to 
emerge. This, however, must be regarded as a soft hypothesis, since 






In the overall range of market segments there is a clear 
convergence over the case studies. While a few decades ago certain 
market segments were lacking in particular cases, like national lotteries in 
the UK, and gaming machines and casinos in Sweden, Hungary and Italy, 
these segments are now part of the national gambling regimes in all of 
our national cases. This convergence is not complete since for instance in 
the Netherlands the commercial exploitation of bingo is not allowed. 
Although, as mentioned above, there remain big differences in the relative 
size of the various market segments, a rather solid hypothesis would be 
that within the EU convergence emerges regarding the increasing 





Considerable differences and even divergence emerges if we look at the 
models of gambling regulation in the sample countries. This concerns in 
particular the controlling power of the state. The benchmark case, the 
Netherlands, is in this respect better compared to the UK and Sweden 
than to Italy and Hungary, although there remain serious differences of 
degree. In these three countries we find a rather complex or multi-
dimensional regulatory model. This multi-dimensionality is on the one 
hand characterised by a separation between gambling legislation and 
gambling control, and on the other hand characterised by differentiations 
in the modes of operation, like private, state or civil society involvement 
in the operation of gambling. In contrast, in Italy and Hungary we find a 
more simplified or one-dimensional regulatory model in which the 
operation of gambling markets is concentrated by the state, which may 
decide to contract out the operation to private or other parties. This brings 
about a more one-sided development of gambling markets in which all 
gambling operations are more or less perceived as similar by nature, and 
the state primarily judges the market developments in terms of the 
financial returns for the treasury.  
However, this dichotomy in regulatory models is more diverse in 
the practise of our sample countries. In practise we find mixed or hybrid 
regulatory models, and also variations in the application of these models 
on market segments. This is for instance relevant for lotteries, which are 
to a large extent defined by the overall gambling regimes. In the UK we 





introduction of the National Lottery the more simplified model of a state 
monopoly was adopted. This is, as we have seen, in sharp contrast with 
for instance the Dutch lottery market, which is more diverse and where in 
particular civil society organisations are more equally represented. 
Relevant for lottery markets is also the distinction between high-risk and 
low-risk forms of gambling, which in the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden 
is to a certain extent characteristic for gambling policies but not in Italy 
and Hungary. Although the differences between and within regulatory 
models for gambling can be considerable, both models enable market 
liberalisations. Our hypothesis would be that divergence in regulatory 
models might occur between the member states of the EU, while 
liberalisations are carried through. The general trend, however, points in 
the overall direction of increasing complexities in the regulation of 
gambling organisations. 
 
A major question of course is how we can account for (the continuation or 
even amplification) of the differences. In a superficial explanation it is 
perhaps tempting to ascribe the differences in popularity of games, 
market size and regulatory prescriptions to differences in ‘national 
cultures.’ For this we can think of the comparatively great popularity of 
sports betting and horse race betting in Sweden and the UK or the 
longstanding popularity of the Italian and Dutch lotteries. However, that 
‘cultural differences’ rather appear secondary, or only indirectly related to 
the differences between national market developments, can be derived 
from the fact that once certain types of gambling, which were not 
previously present, are introduced on the market, these games tend to be 
quickly absorbed in the various national cultures. Clear cases in point are 
the relatively late introduction of a national lottery in the UK and the 
relatively late introduction of gaming machines, casinos and bingo in 
Sweden, Italy and Hungary. In this respect the hypothesis would be that 
the comparatively late development of these markets not so much reflects 
cultural preferences among the population, but rather relates to the 
dissolution of institutional blockades.  
Precisely because of the tight state control over gambling markets, 
the development of these markets is to a considerable extent influenced 
by the supply-side of the market (Kingma 2002). This means that 
institutional arrangements, historical developments and political cultures 
play an important role in understanding and explaining the differences. 





‘path-dependency’ and by ‘co-evolutions.’ Path-dependency means that 
certain developments depend on earlier decisions and developments. ‘Co-
evolution’ means that gambling markets are developed next to other 
organisational and institutional developments. Liberalisations are generally 
part of a wider set of societal transformations, for instance like those 
related to deregulation policies. And once certain types of gambling are 
established, this may in its turn influence the options, constraints and 
evolutionary trajectory of other types of gambling. For these reasons, the 
popularity of certain types of gambling does not only have to point at 
cultural preferences for particular games. It can also point at the 
organisational power of the driving institutions behind markets, like for 




5.3 The distribution of revenues 
In chapter 3 we have discussed the role of the state and the civil society 
in the distribution of gambling revenues. We have seen that gambling 
markets and in particular lotteries are connected to the wider society in 
divers ways. The state generally not only holds controlling power over 
gambling, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, but also shares in the 
revenues of gambling and has a role in the redistribution of the revenues. 
Private and civil society organisations can also have an interest in the 
operation of lotteries as well as in the distribution of the revenues. Private 
organisations in some cases operate gambling enterprises on behalf of the 
state and in other cases get a share in the revenues. Civil society 
organisations are in some cases also involved in the operation of gambling 
and in other cases share in the revenues via the redistribution by the 
government or specific funding organisations. 
The involvement of state, private and civil society organisations in 
the distribution of revenues entails a risk of substitution effects, in which 
gambling revenues cover causes that were previously taken care of by the 
state. It seems that a close political involvement in the distribution of the 
revenues makes substitution effects apparent. As we have seen, in 
particular in the UK this has led to significant debate over substitution in 
the case of the National Lottery (Reith 2002). 
Because of the spectacular market growth, the social and economic 
importance of gambling for the wider society has increased considerably. 





relations are not equal in our sample countries of EU members. Regarding 
the connections with the wider society and the distribution of revenues we 
will distinguish between ‘common trajectories’ and processes of 
‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’ (Hay 2004), just as, and partly related to, 
in the case of the national gambling markets and regulations we discussed 
in the preceding paragraph.  
In our benchmark case, the Netherlands, gambling is clearly 
connected to the wider society in diverse ways. All kind of productive 
relationships profit from gambling: gaming machines contribute to the 
private sector; casinos and the State Lottery contribute to the state; and 
the Lotto and the National Good Causes Lotteries all contribute directly or 
indirectly to civil society organisations. The Dutch state also shares in the 
revenues by gambling tax or VAT. In the field of lotteries there even is a 
fairly even share between revenues for the state and revenues for the civil 
society. This relates in particular to the expansion of the lottery sector 
with the National Good Causes Lotteries. 
In the sample countries, the involvement of different types of 
organisations and the distribution of revenues also includes a wide range 
of productive relations. At the same time, as we have seen, there are 
serious differences with respect to the relative share of the various types 
of organisations and the market segments they are involved in and 
benefiting from. In Sweden and the UK the civil society also benefits to a 
considerable extent from lotteries, although to a lesser extent than in the 
Netherlands. In Italy and Hungary the private sector involvement in 
gambling is much bigger than in the Netherlands (and also Sweden). In 
particular in Italy there is a considerable hidden (behind the back of the 
state) private interest in gambling markets, because of the comparatively 
large shares of the operators, like for instance Lottomatica in the case of 
the Gioco del Lotto. By contrast, the civil society in Italy and Hungary 
does share to a far lesser extent, and only through the redistribution 
mechanisms of the state, or through campaigns within the frameworks 
sponsoring and of Corporate Social Responsibility actions of operators or 
regulators, although it is not completely excluded from the benefits of 
gambling. For the shares of the civil society in gambling markets 
divergence rather than convergence seems to emerge in our sample of 
countries. This, however, must be regarded as a soft hypothesis, since the 
outsourcing policies in Italy and Hungary and the civil society initiatives in 
Sweden and the UK are only recently and rapidly developing. In this 





 However, in the overall range of productive relationships on 
gambling markets there appears to be convergence over the case studies. 
While, just as in the case of certain market segments, a few decades ago 
certain types of productive relationships were lacking in particular cases, 
like the private involvement in the Netherlands and Sweden or the civil 
society involvement in the UK, these types of productive relations are now 
also involved in gambling markets and at least not principally excluded. 
The relative small part of the civil society in Italy is caused by the 
outsourcing policy, which primarily includes private organisations. In 
Hungary this is caused by the central role of the state. NGOs only receive 
a small part in the redistribution processes as managed by the state. This 
effect is partly related to the regulatory model of these countries, in which 
the state itself is responsible for gambling operations and gambling 
policies are primarily motivated by the (state) revenues. In Hungary, as 
became clear in 1995 with the abolishment of the ‘Gambling Fund,’ this 
also seems to relate to the budget deficit of the state and a relatively low 
level of trust in distributing bodies and civil society organisations. 
However, this does not mean that the state is not able to include civil 
society organisations in both its outsourcing and its redistribution policies. 
Our hypothesis would be that this is even conceivable without adapting or 
changing the regulatory model for gambling markets, although an 
adaptation in the approach of gambling markets, more in the direction of 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, would indeed create more 
favourable conditions for civil society organisations.     
 
 
5.4 The European context 
In chapter 4 we have seen that and how the EU emerges as a new 
regulatory force in the field of gambling. In this case we do not (only) 
analyse the similarities and differences between our five sample countries 
of EU members. Instead the analysis is composed on the basis of a 
‘multilevel governance’ approach (Hooghe 2001). Multilevel governance 
focuses upon overlapping authorities and shared competencies among a 
variety of actors, including private and civil society organisations, at a 
variety of scale levels. This approach of the EU deals with processes in 
between ‘inter-governmentalism,’ which stresses the international 
cooperation between nation states, and ‘supra-nationalism,’ which 
stresses the development of a new state. In the case of gambling markets 





the takeover of national gambling policies. In our analyses we 
distinguished between processes at the level of the EU, the national 
jurisdictions and international organisations. 
 On the level of the EU the debate regarding the regulation of 
gambling has recently changed from a political debate on the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ to a legal debate on ‘proportionality.’ Since 1992 gambling 
markets were primarily regarded to be a matter of national regulation. 
The EU did not interfere because the national regulation of gambling 
markets was regarded as more effective and efficient. In the context of 
the ‘service directive’ this idea was reconsidered (Commission of the 
European Communities 2004). The service directive actively seeks to 
eliminate the obstacles to the freedom of establishments for service 
providers and the free movement of services between member states. The 
crucial issue in this debate was whether or not gambling could be 
regarded as normalised services or goods. The European Parliament 
decided that gambling should be excluded from this directive. However, 
this is not only a political but also a legal issue as explored by the ECJ. In 
the Gambelli case the ECJ has stressed the principle of ‘proportionality,’ 
which means that national restrictions on the exploitation of gambling, 
including monopolies, are only allowed if the restrictive policies are 
convincingly applied (Verbiest 2004). Our hypothesis in this respect is that 
the liberalisation and expansion of national gambling markets itself 
undermines the restrictive policies. The consequences of the EU for 
national gambling jurisdictions have therefore become dependent upon 
the responses in national gambling policies.  
The national gambling regimes both influence the EU and manage 
the consequences of EU policies. There are clear differences in the extent 
of international involvement and in the positions taken by the gambling 
authorities and operators in the five EU member states of our sample. All 
jurisdictions experience foreign competition from operators in other EU 
member states. International competition is not new but is accelerated 
because of the use of high tech media in ‘remote gambling,’ like mobile 
phones and the Internet. What is new is that this competition takes place 
in the unclear regulatory framework of the EU. The responses in the five 
member states are still ‘under construction’ but vary from proponents of 
liberalisation and market harmonisation to defensive responses. Our 
hypothesis in this respect is that the current interests of gambling 
organisations will reinforce restrictive policies, as happens in the 





reduce their privileges. However, this must be regarded as a soft 
hypothesis, since the legal debate is only recently and rapidly developing. 
It remains to be seen to which extent national jurisdictions will be able to 
resist international competition, and to which extent the success of 
gambling monopolies will not paradoxically undermine their protected 
status.  
 Finally, we have seen that in the field op gambling already 
international networks of operators, regulators and researchers are 
developing. These networks generally aim at the sharing of information 
and the development of common ideas, and in some cases even common 
products. A rather sound hypotheses is that the international networks will 
itself contribute to the harmonisation of gambling markets because of the 
mitigation of potential conflicts and the copying of ‘best practices.’ These 
best practices concern regulatory practices as well as game formats like 
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Supplement I – Turnover and market share 
 
Net returns* & market share 
 
In million € 
2003/2004 
Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom Italy Hungary 










Lotteries** € 824  36.5% € 682  42% € 3.428  29% € 6.313  84% € 246  41% 
Sports betting 
& pools*** 
€ 20  0.9% € 517  32% € 3.601  30% € 167  2% € 26  4% 
Gaming 
machines 
€ 731  32.4% € 228  14% € 3.000  25% € 722  10% € 281 47% 
Casinos € 682  30.2% € 78  5% € 1.058  9% 0 0 € 43  7% 
Bingo € 0  0 € 68  4% € 724  6% € 308  4% € 0  0% 
Other € 0  0 € 52  3% € 0   0% 0 0 € 0  0% 
Total € 2.257  100% € 1.625  100% € 11.811  100% € 7.510  100% € 596  100% 




16,2   8,9   59,4   57,4   10,1   
Turnover per 
capita 
€ 139    € 183    € 199    € 131    € 59    
* Net turnover or net returns is total sales minus prize money 
** Lotteries includes (national) lotteries, lotto games and number games  








Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom Italy Hungary 




    
1990       Law 1990/62: 
maximum of National 
Lotteries per year is set 
to 13 
  
1991   Folkspel gets license for 
BingoLotto 





1992 Scratch cards 
introduced 
Denationalisation 
of the State lottery 
      Scratch cards 
introduced  
1993    Office for the National 
Lottery (OFLOT) founded  
Regulatory framework 






1994 Scratch cards 
become monopoly 




  Camelot plc wins tender to 
operate National Lottery; 
online launch of National 
Lottery in 10.000 outlets 
Lottomatica wins tender 
to operate the Gioco del 
Lotto; AAMS becomes 
supervisor for Gioco del 
Lotto and scratch cards 




owned retail outlets 
(260 lottery shops) 
were outfitted with 
on-line terminal  
1995 Report "Kansspelen 
Herijkt"  
Lottery Act (1994) goes 
into force 
Scratch cards introduced Law 1995/549 (another) 
increase in the number 
of retailers for the lotto 
UNIRE gets monopoly 
on horse racing 
Szerenscejáték Rt. 










beneficiaries of the 
National Postcode 
Lottery extended 
 Lucky Dipp introduced Law 1996/662: second 
draw (midweek) draw 
introduced, destined for 
Culture; Management of 
horse race betting 
transferred from UNIRE 
to AAMS 
 
1997   Svenska Spel established 
as a result of a merger 
between Penninglotteriet 
and Tipstjänst  
Gaming machines (VLTs) 
legalised (for restaurants 
and bars with license to 
sell alcohol)  
 
Unibet opens office in 
Sweden 
Midweek draw of National 
Lottery introduced  
 
Camelot raises the target 
for good causes from €13.3 
to €14.8 billion  
 
Review of the National 
Lottery; New Opportunities 
Fund (distributing fund) 
Midweek draw of Gioco 
del Lotto;  
 
Lottomatica wins second 




introduced (SISAL) - 
Launch of SISAL TV 
(Satellite TV system in 
all betting SISAL shops) 
Lotto Show, a 
public drawing of 
the 5/90 Lotto, 
begins  
 






1998 Novamedia takes 
over the Sponsor 
lottery  
Autoto takes over 
the organisation of 
horseracing from 
Hippo Toto 
    DPR 1998/174 and DPR 
1998/169 sets the rules 
for assigning games and 
bests on sports, 
respectively horse 
racing to a private 
operator  
MD 1998: authority to 
collect taxes and to pay 
out prizes is transferred 
from AAMS to 
Lottomatica 
  
1999 Competition board 
vetoes merger 
between the state 
lottery, lotto and 
bank lottery 
Casino Act (1999) goes 
into force  
 
Amendment Lottery Act: 
AWP machines only 
allowed in amusement 
parks 
National Lottery 
Commission (NLC) replaces 
Office for the National 
Lottery (OFLOT) as 
regulator of the National 
Lottery 
 
2d call for tender for 
operation of the National 
Lottery 
Law 1999/133: ministry 
of Economics and 
Finance has the 
permission to organise 
bets on events not 
organised by 
CONI/UNIRE - fixed 
prize payout is set on 
38% 
 
2000 MDW report 
published 
   Camelot raises 
contribution to good causes 
from €14,9 to  € 15,8 
billion  
Launch of lotto extra (twice 
weekly jackpot only) 
AAMS becomes 
supervisor for the Bingo 
SNAI group becomes 
operator for horse 




allows taking bets over 
the phone or internet 
(excl. Gioco del Lotto) 
Technological 
modernization; 
almost all points of 
sale provided with 





2001  Projectbureau 
Games of Chance 
established at the 





1st casinos open 
(Sundsval & Malmö) 
Gambling Review Report 
(Budd report) published 
 
Camelot wins second 
tender to operate The 
National Lottery  
Camelot reaches  €15.5 





Camelot a license to 
operate interactive games 
(scratch cards) via the 
Internet 
Lottomatica quotation 
on the stock market  
Lottomatica takes over 
a 50% share in Global 
Bingo Corporation) 
(Gbc) - the Spanish 
market leader in Bingo  
 
Ministerial Decree 
10.09.2001: lotto bets 
can be placed by 
telephone/ internet  
 
New financial legislation 
regarding VLT's: only 
token machines are 
allowed 
 
1st bingo hall opens in 
Treviso 
 Off-line sales 
discontinued 
2002 1st Progress report 
on games of 
chance 
Non governmental 
organisations are allowed 
to organise bingo, 
lotteries and casinos via 
internet, via SMS, and via 
IdTV 
 
3rd casino opens 
(Gothenburg) 




consultation report "Review 
of Lottery Licensing and 
Regulation" 
AAMS becomes 
responsible for all 
gambling forms, incl 
sports betting and horse 
betting from CONI 
UNIRE  
 
Take over by 
Lottomatica of 100% 





betting twice a 
week); After five- 
and six-score 
lottery, joker is 





Spa, the biggest share 
holder of Cirsa Group 
(bingo sector) 
2003 Report "Vernieuwd 
Toezicht op de 
Kansspelen" (New 
supervision on 
games of chance)  
Concentration of all 
tasks regarding 
games of chances 
under the Ministry 
of Justice 
Svenska Spel and ATG 
are allowed to organise 
bingo, lotteries and 
casinos via the internet, 
via SMS, and via IdTV 





gambling addiction results 
in the prohibition of 3.000 
gaming machines  
 
Several products of 
Svenska Spel are offered 
via internet; experiments 
with gambling via SMS 
Launch of interactive 
instant lottery games via 
the internet 
 
"National Lottery Licensing 
and Regulation" 
 
Daily Play introduced Lotto 
and Daily play are offered 
via  internet 
SISAL creates SISAL 
S.p.a. (SISAL Financial 
Service): new financial 
services on online 
system  
 
Lottomatica's license is 
automatically renewed 
until 2012  
 
GAMBELLI case 





Joker is available 
also on 
Scandinavian Lotto 













Internet bingo introduced 
(Svenska Spel)  
 
Novamedia sells 
BingoLotto to Folkspel 




200 VLT’s removed by 
Svenska Spel from 
restaurants; new VLTs 
designed, to be launched 
in 2005 
Euromiliones introduced  
 
Launch of Sky Active by 





Lottomatica, SISAL and 
SNAI become 





traditional lotteries and 
instant lotteries  
Lottomatica sells all 
stakes in Gbc 
  




Svenska Spel announces 
establishment of new 
business unit: Svenska 
Spel International and 
Svenska Spel signs 
partnership agreement 
with Boss Media  
 
Bingo and the scratch 
cards Triss and Tia 
introduced via mobile 
phone  
 
Launch of Svenska 
Postkodlotteriet 
 New Gambling Bill goes 
(partly) into force 
 Three months pilot 
starts with extra draw 
(3rd) of the Gioco del 
Lotto 
 
 Gambling taxes are 






Supplement III – Operators and products 
 
 
Country Operator Products  
Stichting Exploitatie Nederlandse 
Staatsloterij (SENS) 
Staatsloterij; koninginnedagloterij; Dayzers; 
Oudejaarsloterij  
Nationale Stichting tot Exploitatie van 
Casinospelen in Nederland (Holland 
Casino) 
Casino 
Stichting de Nationale  Sporttotalisator 
(SNS/ De Lotto) 
Lotto, Euroloterij; Lucky Day; Toto; 
Krasloten (scratch cards) 
Holding Nationale Goede Doelenloterijen 
NV 
National Postcode Lottery; Sponsor Lottery; 
Bank Lottery 





Private operation Slotmachines 
Svenska Spel AB  Drawing games; Sports betting; Casino 
Cosmopol 
AB Trav och Galop (ATG) Horse race betting 
 
Sweden 
Public benefit organizations Lotteries and bingo 
Camelot Group plc.  National Lottery: lotto, Euromiliones, Daily 
play, Thunderball, Instant win games 
Private operators  Betting & bookmaking 
Private operators Horse race betting 
Private operators Casinos 






Private operators Bingo halls 
Lottomatica S.p.A  Gioco del Lotto (lotto), Tris (horseracing; 
totalisator), AWP, traditional lotteries and 
scratch cards (See below), Totocalcio, 
Totogol 
SISAL S.p.A Superenalotto, Pool games: Totocalcio, 
Totogol & Totip Betting- Big Match, Big 
Show, Big Race 
Consortio Lotterie Nazionale (Lottomatica 
S.p.A, Scientific Games International Inc., 
Arianna 2001 S.p.A, Servizi Base 2001 
S.p.A, Olivetti Tecnost S.p.A,) 
Lotterie Traditionale (Traditional Lotteries); 
Gratta e Vinci (Scratch cards) 
SNAI S.p.A. (Serviceprovider to different 
agencies, authorized to issues licenses) 
Totalisator (Horserace betting) 
Lottomatica, Sisal, SNAI New Slot (AWP machines) 






Local authorities Casinos (Val d’Aoste, Venezia, San Remo, 
Campione) 
Szerenscejáték Rt  Drawing games (6/45 lotto, 5/90 lotto, 
Luxor, Scandinavian Lotto, Keno, Joker), 
Sports betting (Toto Pools, Gol Totó, Tippmix  
Private operators Slotmachines 
Casino Group (subsidiary of 
Szerenscejáték Rt ) & private operators  
Vasino Sopron, Belvarosi Kasino, Tropicana 













College van Toezicht op de Kansspelen (Dutch Gambling Board) 
De Lotto (concessionaire of the Lotto game, Toto and instant lotteries) 
Ministerie van Justitie- projectbureau Kansspelen (Ministry of Justice, bureau for 
the Games of Chance) 




Cancerfonden (Cancer Foundation) 
Ideella Spel 
Lottericentralen 
Lotteriinspektionen (Swedish gaming board) 
Svenska Postkodlotteriet (Swedish Postcode Lottery) 
Svenska Spel 
University of Götenburg 
University of Stockholm, SoRAD 
 
United Kingdom 




Aministrazione autonoma dei monopoli di stato, AAMS (Italian Gambling Board) 







Foundation for Democratic Development (DEMNET) 
NIOK 
Szerenscejáték Felügyelet (Hungarian Gambling Board) 
Szerenscejáték Rt (Hungarian State lottery) 
 
Other 
European Association for the Study of Gambling (EASG) 
European Lotteries (EL) 





Supplement V – Abbreviations  
 
AAMS Amministrazione autonoma dei monopoli di 
stato 
(Autonomous Administration of the 
Monopolies of the State) 
ALN Algemene Loterij Nederland General Lottery Netherlands 
ARGO Association of Remote Gambling Operators   
ATG AB Trav och Galop (Swedish Horse breeding 
organisation) 
AWP  Amusement With Prizes   
CBF Centraal Bureau Fondsenwerving Central Bureau Fundraising 
CONI Comitato olimpico nazionale italiano (Italian National Olympic Committee) 
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sports 
(UK) 
  
DOEN Stichting Doen (DOEN Foundation, distributing fund) 
EASG European Association for the Study of 
Gambling 
  
EBA European Betting Association   
EC European Commission   
EJC European Court of Justice   
EL European Lotteries   
EU European Union   
GC Gambling Commission (UK)   
GNP Gross National Product   
GREF Gaming Regulators European Forum   
HC Holland Casino   
IdTv Digital television   
IMF International Monetary Fund   
KNVB Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbal Bond (Royal Dutch Soccer Union) 
NGCL Nationale Goede Doelen Loterijen (National Good Causes Lotteries) 
NGO Non-governmental organisation   
NHS National Health Service   
NL National Lottery UK   
NLC National Lottery Commission    
NLDF National Lottery Distribution Fund   
NmA Nederlandse Mededingings Authoriteit Dutch Competition Board 
NOC*NSF Dutch Olympic Committee   
NOF New Opportunities Fund   
NPL Nationale Postcode Loterij National Postcode Lottery 
OFLOT Office for the National Lottery    
OTP National Savings Bank (Hungary)   






SIIPAC Società italiana per l'intervento sulle 
patologie compulsive 
Italian Association for the treatment 
of compulsive pathology 
SMS Short Message Service   
SNIL Stichting Nationale Instant Loterij Foundation National Instant Lotteries 
SNS Stichting Nederlandse Sporttotalisator Dutch Sportstotalisator 
SzRt Szerenscejáték Rt. (Hungary)   
UNIRE Unione nazionale per l'incremento delle 
razza equine 
(National Horse breeding authority 
VAT Value Added Tax   
VLT Video Lottery Terminal   
 
 
